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STUDENT COMMENTS
The following comments were written by students at Northwestern University School of Law.
Contributors to the present issue are Harry J. Seigle, and T. Michael Bolger.
THE CONVICT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
The evolution of a coherent and effective law
guaranteeing convicts1 the right 2 to a speedy trial
under the Sixth Amendment3 has been slow. It
was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court in
Klopfer v. North Carolina4 held the speedy trial
clause to be applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.5 For the convicted im-
prisoned in one jurisdiction against whom charges
had been filed in another, the right to a speedy
trial was virtually nugatory as a consequence of
his incarceration. As a result of Smith v. Hooey,6 a
recent Supreme Court pronouncement concerning
the imprisoned's Sixth Amendment rights, the
convict's right to a speedy trial has taken on new
vitality. The Court, realizing the manifold harms
'The term "convict" in this comment is used to
refer to prisoners who have been convicted and are
serving sentence in one jurisdiction on charges unre-
lated to ones that might be outstanding in the same
or another jurisdiction.
2 F. HExtR, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 61 (1951).
Because the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guaranty
must be affirmatively demanded by one seeking its
protection and is often said to be subordinate to the
broader aims of "public justice", it is considered by
some scholars to be a privilege rather than a right. The
Supreme Court, however, has consistently referred to
it as a right. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213, 223 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,
120 (1966); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1904).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ......
4 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). "We hold here that the
right to speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the
rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That right
has its roots at the very foundation of our English
law heritage." See id. at 223-226 for a concise summary
of the historical background of the Sixth Amendment.
I For a general discussion of the development of
the speedy trial guaranty, see, Note, The Right to a
Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv. 476 (1968); Note, The
Lagging Right to Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. R.Ev. 1587
(1965).6 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
incident to denial of a convict's right to a speedy
trial on outstanding charges, placed upon the
prosecuting jurisdiction the "constitutional duty
to make a diligent, good faith effort.. ." 7 to
bring the imprisoned accused to trial upon his
demand.
The Hooey decision marks a new trend in the
law surrounding speedy trial in assuring convicts
their constitutional rights. In conjunction with
other recent decisions,' it will have profound effects
on penal administration, the law concerning speedy
trial as well as relevant procedural mechanics.
This article will explore the ramifications of
Hooey in these areas and suggest possible reforms
in each.
TmnE DETALNER SYSTEM
The administrative means by which a prisoner
normally becomes aware of outstanding charges
against him in other jurisdictions is through a de-
tainer 9 sent by prosecuting authorities to the
warden of the accused's place of detention. In
some cases the detainer amounts to nothing more
than a letter informing prison officials that an in-
mate is wanted elsewhere upon the completion of
his sentence.1' More typically in an interstate
7 Id. at 383.
s See Dickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct. 1564
(1970) (held, by implication, Smith v. Hooey and
Klopfer v. North Carolina to be retroactive in their
application). In Dickey, the state's delay in bringing
petitioner to trial in 1968 on 1960 charges on account
of petitioner's imprisonment in a federal penetentiary
was held a denial of his right to speedy trial.
9 It is also referred to as a hold order, detainer
warrant, or sticker.
10 L. Wenzel, Detainers: A National Survey and The
Right to Speedy Trial 2-8, April, 1969 (Unpublished
Thesis, Northwestern University School of Law).
Wenzel in exploring the use and effects of detainers,
approximates that there are about 23,700 detainers
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situation, the demanding jurisdiction obtains a
warrant for the arrest of the convict which is
attached to the detainer and forwarded to the
incarcerating jurisdiction to be executed upon the
convict's release.' The detainer serves three
functions: it notifies prison officials that a prisoner
is wanted in another jurisdiction, it informs the
convict of the pending charges,12 and it requests
that the authorities desiring custody be informed
of the prisoner's date of release in order to facilitate
his transfer or extradition to the accusing jurisdic-
tion 8
The detainer system evolved as a semi-official
means of gaining custody of an out-of-state accused
without the "red tape" and expense involved in
formal extradition proceedings. 4 The relative ease
and lack of expense in the issuance of detainers
certainly accounts for their ubiquity in prisons
today.15 Unlike a warrant, a detainer is not subject
to judicial control or supervision. Consequently it
may be issued by those who have no authority to
command a warrant, i.e., probation officers and
prison officials.' 6 As a detainer may be sent without
any showing of cause or formal grounds, abuse is
common. Often a detainer is sent merely for pur-
poses of interrogation or retribution. 7 In the past,
callous prosecutors have issued detainers on con-
victs merely for purposes of harrassment with no
intent of eventual prosecution.18 This abuse is
suggested by the fact that over one half the de-
tainers filed are never acted upon. 9 In the federal
on file against the 342,900 convicts (exclusive of juve-
niles) in the United States today. He reports that 70%
of these detainers are based upon the fact the convict
has an untried charge pending against him. Another
18% of the detainers on file are based on probation
or parole violations.
"Note, Detainers: A Problem in Interstate Criminal
Administration, 48 CoLum. L. R:v. 1190, 1191 (1948).
When more than one detainer has been issued against
an inmate, priority is afforded to the one filed first.
"See text accompanying note 132, 133 infra.
1 Comment, Detainers and the Correctional Process,
1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417 (1966). In most cases formal
extradition proceedings are waived.
14 For a discussion of the history and nature of the
detainer system see id. at 418.
15 See notes 9 supra and 17 infra.
6 See Note, supra note 11, at 1191.
17 Cf. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187(4th Cir. 1968); Crow v. United States, 323 F.2d 888
(8th Cir. 1963); United States v'. Candelaria, 131 F.
Supp. 797, 805 (S.D.Cal. 1955); Comment, supra note
13, at 417; Note, supra note 11, at 1193.
"8 See Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806,
415 P.2d 809, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (1966) wherein
the prosecutor was quoted as saying that as far as he
was concerned, the defendants could "sit and rot in
prison for the rest of their lives."
"94 CRw. L. RiTm. 4131 (1968); Comment, supra
penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, for example,
roughly thirty per-cent of the inmates had de-
tainers served upon them in 1958, a majority of
which were eventually dropped."1
The deleterious effects of detainers on the con-
vict as well as prison administration"I have been
most grave. In many state penitentiaries a de-
tainer foreclosed the possibility of parole,"2 al-
though the existence of a detainer no longer auto-
matically precludes a federal prisoner from parole.2
Aside from the possible denial of parole, the de-
tainer serves as an albatross by subjecting the
prisoner to maximum security confinement and
denial of "trusty" status. Because of a detainer,
many convicts, otherwise qualified, are denied
participation in progressive rehabilitation pro-
grams.' 4 This is justified by the assertion that a de-
tainee is an escape risk."5 Such action not only
frustrates the rehabilitation of the accused con-
vict, but further exascerbates the convict's bitter-
ness towards the penal system.
Untried detainers undermine prisoner rehabili-
tation." The detainer instills within the mind of a
prisoner an almost incurable sense of hopeless-
note 13, at 417. In Wenzel's thesis, supra note 10, the
author found in one jurisdiction as many as 82% of
the detainers filed are never acted upon.
20 Bennet, The Last Full Ounce, FED. PROBATION,
Vol. 23, June, 1959, at 21. During fiscal year 1958,
Leavenworth bad 380 detainers filed of which only
114 were ever executed.
"1 "The clerical time alone incident to the handling
of detainers costs several thousand dollars a year in a
large institution." Id. at 21.
2 Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187 (4th
Cir. 1968); Heyns, The Detainer in a States Correctional
System, FED. PROBATION, Vol. 9, July-September, 1945,
at 13-14; Note, supra note 11, at 1192 where it is
pointed out that denial of parole is further exascerbated
by the adverse effect it will have on the minds of
sentencing and parole officials in the accusing jurisdic-
tion who might consider the detainee's original denial
of parole as indicative of his unfitness for freedom.
See also Comment, supra note 13, at 420 (extensive
review of authority demonstrating how otherwise
qualified prisoners are denied parole simply because
of a detainer).
3 28 C.F.R. § 2.9 (1968).
24 See Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 713
(N.D. Ga. 1969); Evans v. Mitchell, 200 Kan. 290,
436 P.2d 408 (1968); Comment, Effective Guaranty of
a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77
YAix L.J. 767 (1968).
25Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 714
(N.D. Ga. 1969); Comment, supra note 13, at 419.
2" United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797,
805 (S.D. Cal. 1955). Because of the adverse effect of
the detainer, the judge drastically reduced the con-
vict's federal sentence to permit an early trial in state
court. Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521, 527




ness?7 The chance of ever gaining freedom is made
increasingly remote with the prospect of a trial in
the distant future for which preparation is seriously
handicapped by virtue of the convict's incarcera-
tion.' Certainly the prospect of release to be ac-
companied by another prosecution on stale or
fatuous charges would chill the zeal of the most
cooperative inmate. Secondly, from the prison ad-
ministrator's standpoint a detainer "makes the
formulation of any effective rehabilitation program
more difficult because of the uncertainty about the
detainee's future." 29 Furthermore, the possibility
of two prisons integrating their rehabilitation pro-
grams for transferred convicts is at best slight.
Even within the same jurisdiction, it would be
difficult to imagine the prison officials of a second
institution beginning at the same point in a re-
habilitation program established by the prison
from which the detainee was taken, especially
where there is a disparity in the resources of the
two institutions?' This situation is further aggra-
vated when one considers the policy, previously
mentioned, of placing convicts on whom detainers
have been issued into maximum security, irrespec-
tive of any real threat they might pose.
THE Doc=nE, oF SMITH v. HOOEY
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey" was
aware of these evils. Petitioner in that case was a
prisoner at Leavenworth, a federal penitentiary in
Kansas. In 1960, the sheriff of Harris County,
Texas, issued a detainer to the federal prison
warden on the basis of an indictment charging
Smith with theft. For six years thereafter, peti-
tioner sought in vain to get a speedy trial by send-
ing periodic letters and more formal "motions"
demanding trial in Judge Hooey's court. Upon
the court's refusal to act upon his motion to dis-
miss for want of prosecution, petitioner brought a
mandamus action in the Texas Supreme Court
seeking an order to show cause why the charge
should not be dismissed. Mandamus having been
denied, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.M
27 cf. State v. Enrenyi, 454 P.2d 101, 103 (Nev.
1969); State ex. rel. Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wis. 2d
504, 511, 123 N.W.2d 305, 309 (1963); Comment,
supra note 24, at 767.
28 Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 262 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); State ex rd. Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wis.
2d 504, 511, 123 N.W.2d 305, 309 (1963).
29 Comment, supra note 13, at 421-22.
20 Note, supra note, 11 at 1192.
31393 U.S. at 378-380.
32 392 U.S. 925 (1968).
Aware of the vexatious nature of untried de-
tainers and their debilitating effects on prisoners,
the Court found that delaying prosecution on a de-
tainer until the end of the convict's sentence
created "undue and oppressive incarceration prior
to trial,"', the primary evil the speedy trial
guaranty serves to prevent.34 The foreclosure of
the possibility of serving concurrent sentences in
conjunction with the oppressive restrictions to
which a detainee is subject were considered as
onerous as incarceration without bail upon an un-
tried charge.3 Similarly, the Court found the
petitioner, as a result of the inactive detainer, to
suffer "anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation" and to have his ability to prepare a
defense impaired by unreasonable delay.5 Ac-
cordingly, the Court per Mr. Justice Stewart de-
manded Texas to make a good-faith effort to bring
petitioner to trial in order to relieve him of the
harms flowing from a detainer on which charges
were pending.
A most vivid illustration of the effect of Smith v.
Hooey on the detainer system is found in the
subsequent case of Lawrence v. Blackwell," where
federal prisoners brought a class action seeking in
part to enjoin the warden at the -United States
penitentiary in Atlanta from imposing special
restrictions as a consequence of the detainers
lodged against themP3 Plaintiffs argued that the
detainer system as a whole was unconstitutional in
that under it present prison administration
"... amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
and a deprivation of due process." 29 Though
denying the convicts the immediate injunctive
relief sought on account of the court's reluctance
"393 U.S. at 378.
34 "This guarantee is an important safeguard to
prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation and to limit the possibilities that
long delay will impair the ability of an accused to
defend himself." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,
120 (1966). See also Dickey v. Florida, -.U.S.-.,
90 S.Ct. 1954, 1570 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
35 393 U.S. at 378.
31 Id. at 379.
"298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
"3 Plaintiffs alleged that the detainers serve to ...
limit their eligibility for parole, remove their
opportunity, if found guilty, to have their state
sentences run concurrently with their federal
service; require them to live in more restricted
quarters than other prisoners; negate participation
in pre-release work details or transfer to minimum-
custody institutions; and adversely affect re-
habilitative efforts.
Id. at 713.
39 Id. at 714.
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to interfere with the affairs of the Executive
branch in prison administration, the court did
hold that if the defendant states failed to make a
diligent, good-faith effort to bring plaintiffs to
trial on outstanding detainers within a reasonable
amount of time, federal prison authorities must re-
move the restrictions flowing from the untried de-
tainers in order to effectuate the right extended in
Smith v. Hooey.'° It would appear that as a con-
sequence of Lawrence v. Blackwell prisoners on
whom inactive detainers have been lodged can,
through injunction, remove the shackles created by
dormant charges in foreign jurisdictions."
In Dickey v. Florida,C the most recent pro-
nouncement of the Supreme Court concerning
speedy trial, petitioner, a convict in a federal
penitentiary, received in 1960 a Florida detainer
charging him with armed robbery in Gadsden
County, Florida. Between 1962 and 1966, Dickey
sent three formal demands 3 for a speedy trial in
the Gadsden County Circuit Court. Each of these
was denied on account of his incarceration in a
federal institution. In response, Dickey petitioned
the Supreme Court of Florida to issue a writ of
mandamus ordering the Gadsden County Court to
secure his return for trial or withdraw the detainer
against him. The Florida court granted the
mandamus petition and ordered the trial court to
secure the return of the accused for a speedy trial."
In 1968, Dickey came to trial on a crime alleged
to have taken place in 1960. His motion to have
the information quashed on the ground that the
delay constituted a denial of his right to a speedy
trial was denied. Dickey was convicted and
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Appeal on
speedy trial grounds to the Florida District Court
of Appeal proved unavailing." s
On writ of certiorari before the United States
Supreme Court, Mr. Chief justice Burger reversed
the decision of the Florida Court and remanded the
40 Id. at 714-16. Worth noting is the district court's
denial of the convicts' motion that outstanding state
charges be dismissed by the federal court. The action
of the Court in this respect was based primarily on
"considerations of federalism and lack of jurisdiction
over the state defendants...."
" See also Kane v. Virginia, 419 F. 2d 1369 (4th
Cir. 1970) which allows detainees federal habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) as discussed in
text accompanying notes 164-172 infra.
4290 S.Ct. 1564 (1970).
3 Petitioner's demands were in the form of writs of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
", 4 Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521, 529 (Fla.
1967).
" Dickey v. State, 215 So.2d 772 (Fla. App. 1968).
case with directions to vacate judgment." The
Court rejected the state's contention that no
duty existed to bring the petitioner to trial until the
Hooey decision in 1969. Without expressly holding
Hooey retroactive, the Court reversed focusing
more narrowly on the prejudice petitioner suffered
on account of the eight year delay, his repeated
demands for a speedy trial, and the absence of any
valid reason for the delay.47 Nevertheless, it may
fairly be implied from Dickey that the doctrine of
Smith v. Hooey is retroactive in its effect on pre-
1969 detainers."
THE CoNvIcT's RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TaAL BErORE Hoo.Y: THE
"No DuTY Rl.E"
Like the administration of the detainer system
and its attendant evils, the law concerning the
convict's right to a speedy trial until the Hooey
decision has been marked by unfairness and
illogic. Considering the historical and jurispru-
dential underpinnings 49 of the speedy trial pro-
vision, it is anomalous that, until Hooey, it was
inapplicable to convicts. Indeed, some courts have
declared the convict to be in most urgent need of
its protection."0
"1 Dickey v. -lorida, -U.S--, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1569
(1970).
47 Id. at 1568-69.
This conclusion is bolstered by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion which asserted that the delay
encountered by the petitioner amounted to a denial of
due process even ... "assuming arguendo that Klopfer
is not retroactive." Id. at 1569. Cf. Carlton v. United
States, 304 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Luck-
man v. Burke, 299 F.Supp. 488 (E.D. Wis. 1969)
(sub silentio).
49 See note 5 supra; Note, Convicts-The R.igtd to
Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERS
L. REv. 828 (1964). See also MAGNA CHARTA ch. 40
(1215) ("To no one will We deny or defer, right or
justice...." Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354,
364 (1956) (dissenting opinion); Petition of Provoo,
17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857
(1955); THE FEDERAMT No. 83-84 (A. Hamilton).
In 1679 Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act, 31
'Car. 11 ch. 2 (1679) which required the Crown either
Tp bring an early prosecution within the passage of
t*,o court sessions or acquit. In 3 W. BLAC&STONE
CoN=NTAaiEs* 136, the famed legalist referred to the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as the bulwark
of th.British Constitution.
0 Se. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F. 2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1965); Taylor v. United States, 238 F. 2d 259, 262
(D.C. Ci .1956); Arrowsmith v. State, 131 Tenn. 480,
487, 175 S.W. 545, 546-47 (1915):
Indeed,"the importance of that consideration
[speedy tri !] is accentuated by the fact of the
accused's imprisonment. 'He is less able on that
account to keep posted as to the movements of his
witnesses, and their testimony may be lost during
19701
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Typically, the issue as to whether a prisoner is
entitled to a speedy trial presents itself on two
planes: intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional.
In the former, the charging and holding authorities
are within the same sovereignty; in the latter in-
stance prosecuting and incarcerating authorities
are of different sovereignties, i.e., two states or, as
in Hooey, state and federal. For the most part, a
speedy trial is and always has been guaranteed to
prisoners held in the same jurisdiction where out-
standing charges are pending regardless of county
differences. 1
The reasons supporting the absolute guaranty
of speedy trial for the convict on an intra-juris-
dictional level are several. Because the accused is
within the boundaries of the charging jurisdiction,
no jurisdictional or extradition problems are posed
in obtaining custody of the prisoner for trial. As
the Court stated in Ex parte Schechtel:' 2
These cases are based upon the principle that even
though the accused under a pending indictment
may be confined to a penal institution of the
same sovereign, he is, nevertheless, in the actual
his continued confinement. It would be a harsh
construction of the clause, containing this guar-
anty, imbedded in our Bill of Rights, that would
deny it application to those who stand most in
need of it.
See also Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57
COLus. L. Rxv. 846, 865 (1957); Walther, Detainer
Warrants and the Speedy Trial Provision, 46 MARQ.
L. REv. 423 (1963).
51 United States ex rd. Coleman v. Cox, 47 F.2d
988 (5th Cir. 1931); United States ex rd. Whitaker v.
Henning, 15 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1926); Frankel v.
Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925); Fulton v.
State, 178 Ark. 841, 12 S.W. 2d 777 (1929); Rader v.
People, 138 Colo. 397, 334 P.2d 437 (1959); Ex parle
Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); Jacobson
v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 415 P.2d 297 (1966); Hottle v.
District Court, 233 Iowa 904, 11 N.W.2d 30 (1943);
Augustus v. Simpson, 416 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. Ct. App.
1967); State v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891,
57 A.L.R.2d 295 (1955); People v. Goldman, 24 Misc.
2d 497, 204 N.Y.S. 2d 770 (1960); Shafer v. State, 43
Ohio App. 493, 183 N.E. 774 (1932); Aowsmith v.
State, 131 Tenn. 480, 175 S.W. 545 (1915); Moreau v.
Bond, 114 Tex. 468, 271 S.W. 379 (1925); Annot.,
118 AL.R. 1037 (1939):
The general rule, followed in the majority of the
states and in the Federal courts, is that, under a
constitutional provision guaranteeing to accused
a speedy trial, and under statutes supplementing
the constitutional provision and enacted for the
purpose of rendering it effective, and prescribing
the time within which accused must be brought
to trial after indictment, a sovereign may not
deny an accused person a speedy trial even though
he is incarcerated in one of that sovereign's penal
institutions under a prior conviction and sentence
in a court of that sovereign.62103 Colo. 77, 83, 82 P. 2d 762, 764 (1938).
custody and control of that sovereign and by its
authority and at its will may be produced in court
for trial upon the untried charge....
Conversely, if a prisoner could forcibly be subject
to trial by the state, he in turn should have the
right to secure a speedy trial where the prosecution
is tardy in coming to court. 3
Furthermore, the right to a speedy trial is
guaranteed in every state constitution with the
exception of New York and Nevada." Many states
have implemented this right by enacting statutes
requiring the prosecution to come to trial within a
statutory period of time." Several states have
"Arrowsmith v. State, 131 Tenn. 480, 486, 175
S.W. 545, 546 (1915).
54ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; A ASKA CONST. art. 1,
§ 11; ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; Aim. CONST. art. 2,
§ 10; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CoLo. CONST. art. 2,§ 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7;
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16; GA. CONST. art. 1, para. 5;
HAwAI CONST. art. 1, § 11; IDAHo CoNsT. art 1, § 13;
ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 9; i;D. CONST. art. 1, § 12; IOWA
CONST. art. 1, § 10, KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10;
KY. CONST. BsIL OP RIGHTS § 11; LA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MD. CONST. DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 21; MASS. CONST. Part 1, art. 11; MIcH.
CONST. art. 1, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6; Miss.
CONST. art. 3, § 26; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT.
CONST. art. 3, § 16; NEB. CONsT. art. 1, § 11; N. H.
CONST. Part 1, art. 14; N. J. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; N. M.
CONST. art. 2, § 14; N. C. CONST. art. 1, § 35; N.D.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; OHIo CONsT. art. 1, § 10; OKLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 20; ORE. CONSTS. art. 1, § 10; PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 18; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7; TENN. CONST.
art. 1, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. 1,
§ 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8;
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22; W. VA. CoNsT. art. 3,
§ 14; Wis. COST. art. 1, § 7; Wyo. CONsT. art. 1, § 10.
s A=z. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 13-161 (1956); ARE.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1708 (1964); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382
(West Supp. 1968); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-12
(1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6910 (1953); FLA.
STAT. AN. § 915.01 (1944); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901(1953); HAwAn R v. STAT. § 705-3 (1968); IDAHo
CODE ANN. § 19-3501 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,§ 103-5 (1969); IND. AnN. STAT. § 9-1402 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1970); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 62-1431 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1201 (West 1964); MIASS. AnN. LAWS ch. 277,
§ 72 (1968); MicH STAT. ANN. § 28.978 (1954); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611-04 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.890
(1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1201-2 (1964); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 178.556 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. 41-11-4
(1953); N.Y. CODE CRm. PRoc. § 668 (McKinney
1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (1965); N.D. CENTr.
CODE § 29-18-01 (1960); Omo REv. CODE ANN.§2945.71 (Baldwin 1964); OnA. STAT. AnN. tit. 22,§ 812 (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 134.110 (1969); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (1964); 1I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 12-13-7 (1969); S.C. CODE Amn. § 17-509
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-2102 (1955); TEx.
CODE CmR. PRoc. art. 32.01 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-51-1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-190 (1960);
WAsH. Rxv. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961); W.VA.
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statutes which expressly grant the convict held
within the state a speedy trial on charges stem-
ruing from a detainer issued from within the state. 6
Under such statutes, the state is required, upon
the convict's demand for trial, to bring him to trial
within a specified period of time or face dismissal
of the charges underlying the detainer.
Though affording the accused convict im-
prisoned within the jurisdiction a speedy trial,
courts67 prior to Smith v. Hooey consistently denied
it to those imprisoned outside the boundaries of
their jurisdiction. The most common rationale sup-
porting the inapplication of the right to speedy
trial to convicts held in foreign jurisdictions was the
comity doctrine. By this theory, whether a con-
vict would be afforded his sixth amendment right
was held to be a matter of comity between the
accusing and holding sovereignties. Because the
release and extradition,6' if employed, of the
accused was solely within the discretion of the
incarcerating jurisdiction and in no way subordi-
nate to any personal right of the prisoner, the
charging jurisdiction was under no legal duty to
CODE ANN. § 62-3-21 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.01
(West Supp. 1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-234 (1957).
6 CA. PEN. CODE § 1381 (West Supp. 1968); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-139 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 915.02 (Supp. 1969); ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-
5(e) (1969); KAN. GEN. STiT. ANN. §§ 62-2901 to 2908
(1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 1391-1393
(West 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616S (1967);
MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 72A (1968); MicE:. STAT.
ANN. §28.969(1) (Supp. 1970); Mo. AiNN. STAT.
§ 222.080 (1959); MONT. Rxv. CODES ANN. § 94-701-1
(1969); N.Y. CODE Cmii Poc. § 669-a (McKinney
1958) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10.2 (1965), ORE. Rnv.
STAT. § 135.510 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 881-
884 (1964); WAsE. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.98.010-040
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.22 (West Supp. 1969).67Edmonds v. County of Jefferson, State of Texas,
402 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1968); Henderson v. Circuit
Court of Tenth Jud. Cir., State of Alabama, 392 F.2d
551 (5th Cir. 1968); Bistram v. Minnesota, 330 F.2d
450 (8th Cir. 1964); McCary v. Kansas, 281 F.2d 185
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 850 (1960); Sanders
v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 375 (N. D. Ga. 1968)(dictum); Troyan v. United States, 240 F.Supp. 383
(D. Kan. 1964); Maryland v. Kurek, 233 F.Supp. 431
(D. Md. 1964); Wzesinski v. Amos, 143 F.Supp. 585(N. D. Ind. 1956); In re Petition of Yager, 138 F.Supp.
717 (E. D. Ky. 1956); Ford v. Presiding Judge, Twen-
tieth Jud. Cir., 277 Ala. 83, 167 So.2d 166 (1964); Lee
v. State, 185 Ark. 253, 47 S.W.2d 11 (1932); Cunning-
ham v. State, 55 Del.475, 188 A.2cd 359 (1962); Evans
v. Mitchell, 200 Kan. 290, 436 P.2d 408 (1968); Kirby
v. State, 222 Md. 421, 160 A.2d 786, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 850 (1960); Traxler v. State, 90 Okla. Crim. 231,
251 P.2d 815 (1952); Cooper v. State, 400 S.W.2d
890 (Tex.1966) overruled in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
374 (1969); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 1046 (1939).
u See, e.g. UNn'oRm CRIMNAL ExTRADITION Act
§§ 2,4,7.
compel the exercise of that discretion. 9 It was
thought that because the prosecuting state lacked
the power or authority to obtain the accused for
trial it could not have the duty to do so.
Underlying the reasoning behind the "no duty"
rule was the fear that the holding state might re-
fuse to release the convict to the prosecuting
jurisdiction; thus subjecting the latter to a form
of "diplomatic" insult. The unreality of this theory
becomes obvious, however, when one considers the
unlikelihood of a state refusing to give over its
prisoners, save in rare situations.60 No doubt any
holding jurisdiction, which consistently failed to
cooperate in sending convicts out for trials in
foreign jurisdictions, would suffer similar re-
prisals when it sought to obtain an out-of-state
convict for trial.
The fictional nature of the comity doctrine is
further highlighted by the fact that twenty states6
have adopted the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers62 and forty-four states6' are party to the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.61 In sub-
59 cf. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); Hen-
derson v. Circuit Court of the Tenth Jud. Cir., State
of Alabama, 392 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1968); Sanders v.
United States, 297 F.Supp. 375 (N. D. Ga. 1968)..
10Kyle v. United States, 211 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.
1954) (wherein Attorney General refused to release
federal convict because of his being an escape risk);
People v. South, 122 Cal. App. 505, 10 P.2d 109 (1932).
11 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1389 (West Supp. 1968); CoN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-186 to 54-192 (1958); HAwAII
REv. STAT. § 714-1 (1968); IowA CODE ANN. § 759A.1
(Supp. 1970); M). ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-R
(1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.147(1) (1969); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 629.294 (Supp. 1970); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §§ 94-1101-1 to 94-1101-6 (1969); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 29-759 to 29-765 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANm. 8 606A:1-6 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:159A to 159A-15 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 669-b (McKinney 1958); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 148-89 to 148-95 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit.19, §§ 1431-1438 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-221
to 228 (Supp. 1968); UTAn CODE ANN. §§ 77-65-4 to
11 (Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 1501-1537
(1970); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.100.010 (Supp.
1969). Massachusetts and Rhode Island are also re-
ported to have enacted the Agreement. Comment,
Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in
Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L. J. 767,774, n.58 (1968).
6The text of the INTERSTATE AGREEM NT ON DE-
mnrs may be found in the following: CoUNm ON
STATE GoVERNMENTs, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION,
PROGRAM FOR 1957 74-78 (1957); COUNCIL ON STATE
GovERNmENTs, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME
CONTROL 91-118 (Rev. ed.1966); ABA STANDARDS
RELATING To SPEEDY TRIAL 50-56 (1967).
" For compilation of state extradition statutes, see
COUNCIL ON STATE GoVERN ENTs, HANDBOOK ON
INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 137-139 (Rev.ed. 1966);
9 UJ.L.A. 143 (Supp. 1967).
0 U.L.A. 263-355 (1957).
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STUDENT COMMENT
scribing to these agreements, states expressly avow.
a policy of permitting the release of convicts on
whom out-of-state detainers have been served."5
Section V of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act applies directly to the extradition of a convict
held in one state to another where criminal charges
are pending.68 Similarly, the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers, promulgated in 1957 by the Council
on State Governments to alleviate the anti-reha-
bilitative effects of long-standing detainers, pro-
vides the convict a trial on charges outstanding in
another jurisdiction within 180 days from the date
of his demandY7 Failure of a state, which is party
to the Agreement, to bring an accused convict to
trial within the prescribed time results in dismissal
of the charges on which a detainer is based. The
purpose and intent of both agreements reflect a
design toward interstate cooperation and collabo-
ration. The "no duty" rule under comity theory
assumes the contrary. The federal government's
disposition toward the release of accused convicts
is exemplified by the express policy of the United
States Bureau of Prisons to honor writs of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum issued out of state courts.68
Cognizant of the realities of modern criminal
administration and the lingering fictions under-
pinning the comity doctrine, Mr. Justice Stewart
in Hooey declared that such "... . doctrinaire con-
cepts of 'power' and 'authority' ... submerge the
practical demands of the constitutional right to a
65 INTERSTATE AGaREMENT ON DETAINERs art. I.
However, Article IV (a) of the INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS and UNszoaRM CRIMNAL ExTRAnrioN
AcT § 4 allow the 6xecutive authority of the holding
state the power to deny the rendition of a convict to
another jurisdiction.
61 UNTORM CaMN A EXTRADITION ACT § 5:
Extradition of Persons Imprisoned or Awaiting
Trial in Another State or Who Have Left the De-
manding State Under Compulsion.
-When it is desired to have returned to this
state a person charged in this state with a crime,
and such person is imprisoned or held under crimi-
nal proceedings then pending against him in an-
other state, the Governor of this state may agree
with the Executive Authority of such other state
for the extradition of such person before the con-
clusion of such proceedings or his term of sentence
in such other state, upon condition that such per-
son be returned to such other state at the expense
of this state as soon as the prosecution in this state
is terminated.
According to the compilation of statutes in COUNCIL ON
STATE GOVERNMENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE
CRIME CONTROL 137-139 (Rev.ed.1966), thirty-four
states are party to Section 5.
6 INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS art. IlI.
6 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374,381 (1969); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,724 (1968). See note 156 infra.
speedy trial." 69 Accordingly, Texas was held to
have a duty to bring petitioner Smith to an early
trial in Judge Hooey's Court.70
Aside from the comity doctrine, more subtle
reasons existed in the courts, prior to Hooey, con-
sistently denying a speedy trial to those incarcer-
ated in foreign jurisdictions. One of these was
administrative difficulty. It was simply burden-
some for prosecutors to seek out and procure de-
fendants for trial who were held in distant state and
federal penitentiaries, 7 especially if formal extradi-
tion was required. Moreover, with bulging dockets
and plethoric case loads, courts as well as prose-
cuting attorneys were prone to delay trial of those
defendants imprisoned outside the jurisdiction. 2
Such practical considerations should not, however,
be allowed to temper fundamental rights. As Mr.
Chief justice Warren emphasized in Pollard v.
United States:.7  "These ... [Sixth Amendment
rights] ... are not mere ceremonials to be neglected
at will in the interests of a crowded calendar or
other expediencies."
Obviously the costs incident to transfering a
convict to trial and back to prison provided a
substantial incentive for state authorities to pro-
crastinate at the expense of convicts' rights. For
example, in Heredon v. State74 the state was not
required to assume the costs of returning an ac-
cused convict for trial who, on his volition, placed
himself beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Such
parsimony, in light of Gideon v. Wainwrighl7 5 and
the right of an indigent to appointment of counsel,
is discomfortingY8 The minority of courts ' that,
8' 393 U.S. at 381.
70 Id. at 383.71 Evans v. County of Delaware, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 390 F.2d 617,, 618 (3rd Cir. 1968).
72 Comment, supra note 13, at 418-19.
7' 352 U.S. 354,364 (1957) (dissenting opinion). See
also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,223 (1967);
Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120, 1126 (D.C.Cir.
1969) (dissenting opinion).
74 369 P.2d 650 (Okla. Crim. 1962). After Smith v.
Hooey, Oklahoma courts have placed the financial
burden of transporting an indigent convict on the state.
See Naugle v. Freeman, 450 P.2d 904 (Okla.Crim.
1969).
75 372 U.S.335 (1963). See also Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S.436, 444 (1966).
It is interesting to note the parallel constitutional
development of the right granted in the Sixth Amend-
ment. In recent years, the assistance of counsel pro-
vision, the final clause of the amendment, has by far
received the greatest attention. The speedy trial clause,
on the other hand, has until recently been marked by a
paucity of judicial recognizance. "Though securely
rooted in history, the right to speedy trial has until
recently been assigned second class status. Courts have
emphasized the relativity, rather than the importance
[VCol. 61
9 SPEEDY TRIAL
prior to Hooey, placed on the state the affirmative
duty of granting convicts in other jurisdictions a
speedy trial rejected the cost argument as well as
others. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated,
"We will not put a price tage upon constitutional
rights." 71 It was this rationale that the Hooey court
used in dismissing the expense objection to grant-
ing speedy trial tQconvicts 79
To a great extent, the cost argument against a
convict having a speedy trial is illusory. The only
real extra cost is the expense of transporting the
defendant back to the holding jurisdiction after
trial, as the trip to trial is necessary regardless if it
takes place during or at the completion of the con-
vict's sentence. Moreover, if at trial the convict is
found guilty, the holding and sentencing jurisdic-
tions could make arrangements whereby the con-
vict could serve his sentences concurrently in the
latter jurisdiction. This procedure would eliminate
a great many expenses.
Secondly, as a consequence of Smith v. Hooey,
prosecutors now have the burden of following each
detainer issued with a trial if the accused convict
so demands. As such, the administrative costs
incident to nuisance detainers will be eliminated.80
Indeed, with the burden on the prosecutor to pur-
sue his detainer with a speedy trial, a great deal
more consideration will go into the ling of a
detainer. No longer will one be able to issue a
detainer carte blanche without any consideration of
the feasibility of prosecution.8' The fatuous nature
of the cost argument is further demonstrated by
the fact all states party to Article Voh) of the
of the right." Comment, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy
Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YArZ L.J.
767, 768 (1968).
7 See Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1968); Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1958); Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259(D.C. Cir. 1956); Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459,
283 S.W.2d 162 (1955); Barker v. Municipal Court,
64 Cal.2d 806, 415 P.2d 809 51 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1966);
Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1967);
Richerson v. Idaho, 91 Idaho 555, 428 P.2d 61 (1967);
People v. Bryarly, 23 Ill. 2d 313, 178 N.E. 326 (1961);
Commonwealth v. McGrath, 348 Mass. 748, 205 N.E.
2d 710 (1965); People v. Winfrey, 20 N.Y.2d 138, 228
N.E.2d 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1967); State ex rel
Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wis.2d. 504, 123 N.W.2d
305 (1963).
78 State ex rd. Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wis.2d 504,
512, 123 N.W.2d 305, 310 (1963). Accord, Common-
wealth v. McGrath, 348 Mass. 748, 752, 205 N.E.2d
710, 714 (1965).
" 393 U.S. at 380, n.11.80See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
81 See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
Interstate Agreement on Detainersu and §24 of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Acts expressly agree
to assume costs of transporting convicts to trial.
Perhaps the most subtle, but strongest motive
behind the old "no duty" rule apart from comity,
cost and convenience was punishment." As the
court stated in McCary v. Kansas" an oft-cited
case supporting the old rule, "The reason for the
rule is that he is in custody in the federal penal
institution because of his own wrongdoing .... . 8
In effect, the old decisions were denying sixth
amendment rights as sub rosa retribution against
defendants jailed in foreign jurisdictions on previ-
ous charges. Such pre-trial punishment took three
forms. By denying the prisoner speedy trial, his
ability to prepare an effective defense was obvi-
ously jeopardized.P The possibility of serving con-
current sentences was totally foreclosed in making
the convict wait until the expiration of his current
sentence before standing trial on any other
charges.P As previously suggested, callous prose-
cutors often would issue detainers for the sole
purpose of aggravating a defendant's stay in
prison.8 9
The devolution of the law denying speedy trial
to convicts, ending in Smith v. Hooey, has been a
slow one. The ratio decidendi of the "no duty" rule,
predicated on lingering fictions of comity and state
sovereignty, produced severe hardship upon im-
prisoned defendants who found their sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy trial in abeyance. In view of
the greater emphasis on the rights of the accused
characteristic of the Warren Court, 0 and the in-
2 I ITEsTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS art.
From the time a party state receives custody of
a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such
prisoner is returned to the territory and custody
of the sending state, the state in which the one or
more untried indictments, informations or com-
plaints are pending or in which trial is being had
shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also
pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping
and returning the prisoner....
Umo~m Cm Nm4NA ExTR m iON AcT § 24 places
on the prosecuting state the duty to pay all transporta-
tion expenses.
84 Comment, supra note 24, at 772-73.
85 281 F.2d 185 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S.850
(1960).8 1 Id. at 187. See also Bistram v. Minnesota, 330 F.
2d 450 (8th Cir. 1964); Cunningham v. State, 55
Del.475, 188 A.2d 359, 360 (1962).
n See note 28 supra.
88 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969).
u See notes 17-19 supra.0 A. CoX, TM WAREN CoUeRT 71-91 (1968); Pye,




creased stress on inter-jurisdictional cooperation in
criminal administration,91 the result in Smith v.
Hooey was not surprising. Further, in light of the
numerous states party to the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act and the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, the comity doctrine as espoused in
Ponzi v. Fessendon"t is now an anachronism.
Accordingly, the Hooey decision compels the state
to afford a convict a speedy trial upon his demand
irrespective of whether he is in federal or state
prison."
THE ELEMENTS OF A SP.EEDY TBiAL
Having attained his right to speedy trial, the
convict may find to his chagrin the right unenforce-
able even in cases of protracted delay. Basically
four factors are relevant in the judicial determina-
tion of whether a denial of speedy trial assumes
constitutional proportions. Though significant, the
length of delay in and of itself is not determinative
in the finding of a violation. 4 But as Mr. Justice
Brennan emphasized in Dickey: "The passage of
time by itself... may ... dangerously reduce
... [the defendant's] ... capacity to counter the
prosecution's charges." 11 More important are the
reasons for the delay; the prejudice and harm to
the defendant as a consequence of the delay; and
the defendant's objection to the delay. It is uni-
formly held that in order to prove a denial of sixth
amendment rights, defendant must prove the delay
to be solely 9 a result of the government's culpable
01 THE PREsmENT's CossrioN ON LAw ENvoacE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE CHx.
LENGE OF CRIE IN A FREE SociETY 279-291 (1967).
92 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
Although the petitioner in Smith v. Hooey was in-
carcerated in a federal prison, the duty imposed on the
state still applies if the accused is imprisoned in another
state penitentiary. May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203
(5th Cir. 1969); Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp. 488
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
14 Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Von Feldt v. United States, 407 F.2d 95 (8th
Cir. 1969); Carroll v. United States, 392 F.2d 185
(1st Cir. 1968); Fleming v. United States, 378 F.2d
502 (1st Cir. 1967); Hampton v. Oklahoma, 368 F.2d
9 (10th Cir. 1966); Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d
215 (6th Cir. 1958) United States v. Valez-Arenaz, 299
F.Supp. 463 (D.C.P.R. 1969); United States v. Bandy,
269 F.Supp. 969 (D.C.N.D. 1967); Note, The Right to
a Speedy Trial, 20 SAwL.REv. 476, 478 (1968).
"1 Dickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1571
(1970) (concurring opinion).
91 Defendant may not complain of any delay of which
he was the cause. Id. at 1574; Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219, 221 n.4 (1968); Morland v. United States,
193 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Alagia, 17 F.R.D. 15, 17 (D.C.DeI.1955); People v.
Barksdale, 110 Ill. App. 2d 163, 166, 249 N.E.2d 165,
or oppressive conduct; 7 the resultant prejudice to
himself; and the absence of any waiver on his
part.8 Because all of these factors overlap each
other in effect, it is difficult both practically and
analytically to distinguish one or any combination
of them as being determinative on the issue of
speedy trial."1 The waiver factor, however, has
received an inordinate amount of attention. Even
in cases of the most flagrant violation of speedy
trial, any sort of express or implied waiver on the
part of the defendant will deny him protection of
the right."'
Despite the express command of the sixth
amendment that a speedy trial will be enjoyed in
all criminal prosecutions, judicial construction"'l
167 (1969); State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Mo.
1969); Annot., 129 A.L.R. 572 (1940).
"Compare Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d
363, 368 (D.C.Cir.1965)(Dictum); United States v.
Reed, 285 F.Supp. 738, 743 (D.C.D.C. 1968) which
held that delay occasioned by the government's negli-
gence, as opposed to willful, culpable conduct, is a
constitutional violation with Petition of Provoo, 17
F.R.D. 183 (D.C.Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955)
where deliberate acts of the prosecution resulted in
long delay. See Dickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct.
1564, 1576 (1967) (Brennan, J. concurring):
A negligent failure by the government to ensure
speedy trial is virtually as damaging to the in-
terests protected by the right as a purposeful fail-
ure.... Thus the crucial question in determining
the legitimacy of governmental delay may be
whether it might reasonably have been avoided-
whether it was unnecessary.
" United States ex red. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412
F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1969); Von Feldt v. United States,
407 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1969); Harling v. United States,
401 F.2d 392 (D.C.Cir. 1968); United States v. Kauf-
man, 393 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1098 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936
(4th Cir. 1966); Hedgepeth v. United States, 365 F.2d
952 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Simmons, 338
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Fay, 313
F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Richardson,
291 F.Supp. 441 (S. D. N. Y. 1968). See also Miller v.
Rodriquez, 373 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1967); Smith v.
United States, 331 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C.Cir. 1964) Flem-
ing v. United States, 378 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1967)
states the test of denial of speedy trial in the disjunc-
tive, i.e., defendant must demonstrate either prejudice
or oppressive, culpable conduct on the part of the
prosecution.
"United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir.
1963).
"'0 United States v. Perez, 398 F. 2d 658 (7th Cir.
1968) (six year delay); Bruce v. United States, 351 F.
2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965), cer. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966)
(seven year delay); United States v. Fouts; 253 F. 2d
215 (6th Cir. 1958), remanded and a.ff'd, 258 F. 2d 402
(6th Cir. 1958) (ten year delay); Carlton v. United
States, 304 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (two year
delay); Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St., 139, 191
N.E.2d 922 (1963) (ten year delay); Barr v. Sheriff,




has engrafted upon the provision the condition
that it is only effective when demanded. Unlike
the law pertaining to the right to counsel,1°2 the
defendant has the burden of ensuring for himself
the right to a speedy trial by taking an affirmative
action demanding that he be brought to trial
within a reasonable amount of time. Failure to take
such action or mere silence by the defendant has
traditionally constituted waiver 03
The demand doctrine is based on the assumption
that defendants might welcome delay in prosecu-
tion as a means of either forestalling punishment or
allowing more time for the preparation of a de-
fense.1"4 Another reason for courts construing a
defendant's silence to be acquiesence in delay is
the fear that a defendant will sit back and let his
case lapse in hopes that either it will be dropped or
that the delay will amount to a deprivation of
speedy trial.V 0 5 Hence, in justification of the de-
mand doctrine jurists often employ the metaphor
that the right to speedy trial is not designed as a
sword for a defendant's escape, but rather as a
shield for the defendant's protection.°6 Also, there
101 E.g., United States v. McCorkle, 413 F.2d 307
(7th Cir. 1969); May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203 (5th
Cir. 1969); Von Feldt v. United States, 407 F.2d 95
(8th Cir. 1969); Chapman v. United States, 376 F.2d
705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 881 (1967); United
States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1966); Bruce
v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966); United States v. Kaufman,
311 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Lustman,
258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958);
United States v. Fouts, 253 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1958),
remanded and a.fd, 258 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1958); China
v. United States, 228 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955); Carlton
v. United States, 304 F.Supp. 818 (E.D.Ark. 1969);
United States v. Penland, 300 F.Supp. 354 (D.C.
Mont. 1969); Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459, 283
S.W.2d 162 (1955); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 160
A.2d 786 (1960); Cummings v. State, . --iss-, 219
So.2d 673 (1969); White v. State, 8 Md.App. 51, 258
A.2d 50 (1969); Petition of Duran, 152 Mont. II, 448
P.2d 137 (1968); State v. McCroskey, 79 N.M. 502,
445 P.2d 105 (1968); People v. Abbatiello, 30 App.
Div. 2d 11, 289 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1968); Mack v. Max-
well, 174 Ohio St. 275, 189 N.E.2d 156 (1963); State
v. Jestes, -Wash_, 448 P.2d 917 (1968); State v.
Stoekle, 41 Wis.2d 378, 164 N.W.2d 303 (1968)- See
Note, The Right to Speedy Trial, 20 Stan.L.Rev. 476,
479-480 (1968); 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcncE,
48.0411] (Cipes ed. 1968); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302
(1958).
10 See note 75 supra.
20" See note 101 supra.
104 Cf. Ponziv. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922);
United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313F.2d 620,
623 (2d Cir. 1963).
"0' Cf. Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684,
688 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Gladding, 265
F.Supp. 850, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).101 United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478
is the contention that the defendant who makes a
demand for speedy trial would probably be most
prejudiced by denial of it °1 This rests on the no-
tion that those who-suffer most from delayed trials
would be most likely to complain.
The vitality of the demand doctrine has not been
lessened by Smith v. Hooeyjlu In that case peti-
tioner addressed demands for a speedy trial to
respondent's court over a six year time span. Ac-
cordingly, post-Hooey courts interpreted the order
of the Supreme Court decision to be predicated on
the demand of the incarcerated.10 9
In Dickey v. Florida," petitioner made three
express demands for trial. The majority opinion
placed great emphasis on this fact in reversing
Dickey's convictionju
An increasing number of courts, however, have
held that it is not incumbent on the accused to
demand a speedy trial or otherwise suffer the loss
of the right.12 As a result, certain exceptions have
grown up around the demand doctrine."9 It is not
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); United
States v. Tchack, 296 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); United States v. Gladding, 265 F. Supp. 850,
854 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
107 United States v. McCorkle, 413 F.2d 307, 309
(7th Cir. 1969).
108 393 U.S. 374 (1969)."Upon the petitioner's demand,
Texas had a constitutional duty to make a diligent,
good-faith effort to bring him before the Harris County
court for trial." Id. at 383 (emphasis added). See 49
NEB. L. Rv. 166, 172 (1969).
log May v. Georgia, 409 F. 2d 203, 204 (5th Cir.
1969); Carton v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 818, 822
(E.D. Ark. 1969); Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp.
488, 494 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Cummings v. State,
Miss._, 219 So. 2d 673, 675 (1969).
11-U.S._-, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970).
M "Petitioner's challenge is directly to the power of
the state to try him after the lapse of eight years during
which he repeatedly demanded and was denied a trial."
Id. at 1568. Mr.-Justice Brennan, however, finding the
demand doctrine of questionable constitutional validity,
stated in his concurring opinion, "I do not read the
Court's opinion as deciding that [the defendant] is not
entitled to speedy trial unless he demands it at the
time of the delay." Id. at 1570 (concurring opinion).
112 E.g. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187
(4th Cir. 1968); Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d 215,
218 (6th Cir. 1958), remanded and afd, 258 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1958); Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259,
261 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Richardson,
291 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Needel v.
Scafati, 289 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 (D.C. Mass. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 761 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969); United States v. Reed,
285 F.Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C.1968); United States v.
Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United
States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230,233 (N.D.Iil. 1955);
Ex parte State, 255 Ala. 443, 446-47, 52 So. 2d 158,
161 (1951); Bell v. State, -Miss_, 220 So. 2d 287,
288 (1969); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 334 (1958).
"'See United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601, 603 (4th
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surprising that most of the cases allowing for
exceptions involve the situation where the defend-
ant is imprisoned. These courts have realized that
the demand doctrine, intended to apply in all cases
where the accused raises his sixth amendment
rights as a defense, has its harshest effect on the
accused convict. As stated in United States v. Chase,
"[A] waiver will not be implied when the action
required to avoid it is virtually impossible. While
it is easy to say that a man confined to Alcatraz
should take active steps in his own behalf, there
are practical obstacles in his path which make this
easier to say than to do." 114
Where the convict is never informed of pending
charges lodged against him by a detainer, he may
be excepted from the demand doctrine." 5 Obvi-
ously a man cannot waive his right to speedy trial
on charges of which he is ignorant. Assuming the
convict is cognizant of outstanding charges, the
problem then arises as to the means available to
make an effective demand. This of course presup-
poses that a convict is even aware of his sixth
amendment right, much less the necessity of
demanding its enforcement. Sensing the inequity of
applying waiver of fundamental rights116 to con-
victs who lack both legal knowledge and resources
to execute a formal demand for trial, courtsn 7 have
engrafted an exception to the demand rule for con-
victs "powerless" to assert their rights.
The exceptions imposed on the demand doctrine
make manifest the gross unfairness of applying the
Cir. 1962); United States v. Gladding, 265 F. Supp.
850, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
114 United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 233
(N.D.I1n. 1955).115 Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.
1968) at 188:
Since this ingredient of basic fairness was ex-
cluded, by keeping the prisoner in ignorance of his
right to demand trial, we will not hold that he was
waived his fundamental right to a speedy trial by
failing to seek an immediate hearing seven years
after the prosecution had initiated proceedings
against him.
Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C. Cir.
1956); United States v. Reed, 285 F. Supp. 738, 741
(D.D.C.1968); Ex parte State, 255 Ala. 443, 446, 52.
So.2d 158, 161 (1951); Bell v. State, --Miss, 220
So.2d 287 (1969).
'
186Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223
(1967).
117 Cf. Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d 215, 218
(6th Cir. 1958), remanded and afd, 258 F.2d 402 (6th
Cir. 1958); United States v. Richardson, 291 F. Supp.
441, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Needel v. Scafati, 289 F.
Supp. 1006, 1013 (D.C. Mass. 1968), rev'd on otler
grounds, 412 F.2d 761 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
861 (1969); United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230,
233 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Commonwealth v. Sutton, 214
Pa. Su er. 148, 251 A.2d 660, 663 (1969) (dissenting
opinion}.
doctrine to convicts at all. The assumption that.a
convict has the requisite knowledge, access to
counsel' 8 and power to make an affirmative
demand for trial when (and if) informed of a de-
tainer is fantasy. To construe a waiver out of a
prisoner's reticence is to ignore the exigent realities
of prison life and places too high a premium on
"public justice." 119
The implicit adherance of Smith v. Hooey and
Dickey v. Florida to the demand doctrine is dis-
appointing from the convict's standpoint. The
presumption that silence constitutes waiver of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial runs against
the grain of modem constitutional law. As made
clear in Johnson v. Zerbst 120 "'[Courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of
fundamental constitutional rights and... 'do not
presume acquiesence in the loss of fundamental
rights.' "121 Accordingly, the test of waiver in
Johnson, a right to counsel case, and later cases1M
has been whether there was "an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."' 23 If waiver is to be based on express
intention and inquiry into "the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding" 2 the defendant,
the demand rule appears constitutionally infirm.
As pointed out in United States v. Richardson:125
"It [the demand doctrine] neither requires any
showing of defendant's intent to waive his right
nor demands any knowledge of this right from a
defendant." If Klopfer v. North Carolina' makes
the right to speedy trial as fundamental as the
right to counsel, no logical reason exists to support
118 United States v. Richardson, 291 F. Supp. 441,
447 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (absence of counsel negates
waiver); THE PRESmENT'S CommssioN oN LAw EN-
FoRcEmENT AND AmINISTRATiON Or JuSTicE, Tnx
CHA=LENGE OF CRI IN A FREE SocmnTY 139-140(1967) The Commission cites legal counsel for convicts
as a "pressing need" of correctional institutions.
119 Beaver v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1904) at 87:
"The right of speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
consistent with delays and depends on circumstances.
It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude
public justice."
See Dickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970),
at 1568: "The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical
or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality on the
need to have charges promptly exposed."
20 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
1 Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted).
m Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966);
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1964); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Glassner v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 70-71 (1942).i 304 U.S. at 464.4 Id. at 464.
125 291 F. Supp. 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
128 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
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a less strict standard of waiver for the former than
that established for the latter.m
It would seem that the demand doctrine's"...
implication of waiver from silence'or inaction
misallocates the burden of ensuring a speedy
trial." 12 If the state has the burden of advising
the accused of his right to counsel and to remain
silent,129 then the duty exists to speedily try the
accused.V 0 Accordingly, it should be presumed
that the accused desires a speedy trial, unless he ex-
pressly accepts or requests a delay. Waiver of one's
right to speedy trial by silence, however, assumes
the contrary and in effect places the burden on the
accused convict to assure himself of his sixth
amendment right."'
The administrative provisions of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers"' are designed to facili-
tate the convict's making the "demand" necessary
under present law. Article 1I1(c) of the Agreement
provides that a warden on receipt of a detainer
shall inform the convict on whom it is lodged of its
source and contents. The warden shall also inform
the prisoner of "his right to make a request for
final disposition of the indictment, information or
complaint on which the detainer is based." 113
Though ameleorative of certain problems endemic
to the demand doctrine, the Agreement makes the
right to speedy trial turn on the defendant's de-
mand. It also allows for the prosecution to circum-
vent the defendant convict's rights by not filing a
detainer at all so as to preclude him from making
any demand. Aware of this pitfall, the American
Bar Association in its Standards Relating to Speedy
Trial places an affirmative duty on the prosecutor
to promptly issue a detainer on defendants known
to be imprisoned within and without the bound-
aries of his jurisdiction.' 4
The ABA Standards as well as the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers, however, still permit
inaction by the defendant to constitute waiver,
although both promote the issuance of a demand.
As a solution to this problem a uniform prison
administrative system might be devised whereby
a prisoner, upon receipt of a detainer, would be
"See Dickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct. 1564,
1575 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring): "The equation of
silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been
categorically rejected by this Court when other fun-
darnental rights are at stake."
1" Id. at 1575. (Brennan, 3. concurring).
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966.)
n0 Dickey v. Florida, -.U.S-, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970).
' Id. at 1575. (Brennan, J. concurring.)
1 See note 62 supra.
M Article 1I1(c).
3 ABA, STANDARDs RELATiNG TO SPEEDY TRL
§3.1 (1967).
forced with the aid of legal counsel to express an
election between demand or waiver of speedy trial.
By this system a prisoner, having been advised by
a lawyer of the consequences of either choice,
could knowingly and intelligently decide to forgo
speedy trial if he so desired. Such a procedure
would effectively eliminate the problems inherent
in the demand doctrine's application to convicts
in its current form.
As previously mentioned, in order for a defend-
ant to claim a denial of his sixth amendment right,
he must allege prejudice."' That is, he must
demonstrate how the delay of which he complains
impairs his ability to defend himself."' This rule,
though unique to speedy trial as contrasted to right
to counsel,' is not without merit where the delay
is relatively short. Such delay may work to the
defendant's advantage in allowing him more time
in trial preparation, or it simply may not cause any
genuine harm. However, in cases of a delay over a
substantial period, the necessity of having the con-
vict demonstrate prejudice is questionable.'"
The convict, by virtue of his imprisonment prior
to trial, can assert two types of prejudice resulting
from delay. Obviously, the defendant's imprison-
ment over a long period prior to trial seriously
impairs procurement of counsel, keeping track of
witnesses, °and pretrial preparation generally.'"
Moreover, the prosecution, who can collect its
evidence immediately while memories are still
fresh and stay in touch with witnesses all during
the interim between indictment and trial, has a
demonstrable advantage over the imprisoned
accused. The convict, unlike the ordinary defend-
ant, does not have the opportunity to make bail.
A second form of prejudice which is unique to
the convict is that which results.to him personally
13 See note 98 supra and accompanying text. See also
United.States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, -122 (1966).
168A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PnACTICE 48.04[31
(Cipes ed. 1968). In Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d
1120, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1969) Judge Wright, dissenting,
points out that there are two kinds of relevant preju-dce:
... prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend
against the charge, and prejudice to his person.
Prejudice to the person takes the milder form of
anxiety and stigma when the accused is released
on bail. Its more virulent form, more oppressive
to the accused and more destructive of the pre-
sumption of innocence, is extended pre-trial incar-
ceration.
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'3sDickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1576-
77 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
219 cf. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, (4th
Cir. 1968); Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318, 320
(5th Cir. 1965); Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259,
262 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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as a consequence of an untried detainer'4
Courts,10 cognizant of the evils accruing from
untried detainers, recently have given increased
judicial attention to these evils as a form of preju-
dice. Although the negative effects of an untried
detainer do not relate directly to the accused's
ability to prepare a defense,' 0 it might be argued
that the adverse psychological effects of a lingering
detainer may in effect produce such deep felt
resignation in the prisoner that he is incapable of
effectively preparing for trial' 43
Although placing the burden of showing preju-
dice on the defendant is not objectionable in cases
where delay is not ipsofacto unreasonably long, the
burden of proof and risk of ultimate non-persuasion
should be reversed in cases of protracted delay.44
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Smith v. Hooey
on this matter is most consonant with the law of
evidence and the Bill of Rights. Realizing peti-
tioner's six year delay to be unreasonable, he
asserted:
If petitioner makes a prima face showing that
he has in fact been prejudiced by the State's
delay, I would then shift to the State the burden
of proving the contrary.145
The allocation of the burden of proving prejudice
1240 See notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
M See e.g. Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182(4th Cir. 1968); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F.Supp.
708 (N.D. Ga. 1969); United States v. Candelaria, 131
F.Supp. 797 (S.D.Cal. 1955).
12 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 48.04[3], at
48-33 (Cipes ed. 1968). "Prejudice experienced by
prisoners against whom detainers are filed without
being brought to trial, can be serious in nature, though
it may not actually impair the ability to defend."
4 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1969)
(by implication).
144 Accord., Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182
(4th Cir. 1968) at 185:
Because this constitutional guarantee is so basic
to a fair trial, courts have made it abundantly
clear that after a delay of this magnitude, it is not
the defendant who must bear the burden of show-
ing prejudice, but the state must carry the obliga-
tion of proving 'that the accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordi-
nary and inevitable delay.' Williams v. United
States,... 250 F.2d 19, 21 (1957); United States
v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958); United
States v. Chase, 135 F.Supp. 230 (N.D.f11.1955).
See also Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120, 1121-
22 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298
F.Supp. 708, 715 (N.D.Ga. 1969). Professor Moore
concurs with the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice that the
maximum period of delay between arrest and trial in
common law felony cases should be four months. 8A
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PnAcnic 48.03[1] (Cipes ed.
1968).
145 393 U.S. at 384.
in cases of prolonged and extended delay might
best be handled by presumption.4 8 Upon defend-
ant's showing of long, unexplained delay, prejudice
would be presumed' 47 thereby shifting to the state
the burden of coming forward to prove the absence
of prejudice. 48 The presumption in favor of the
defendant more clearly reflects the strong prob-
ability that unreasonable pre-trial delay is far more
likely to be detrimental to the defendant's case
than to have no effect at all 49 Indeed, if the prose-
cution causes the delay, it should have to account
for it. 15
EXECUTrNG THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
"While Smith v. Hooey dearly establishes a right
to a speedy trial for federal prisoners with pending
state charges, it gives precious little practical
guidance to the lower courts about the effectuation
of that right." ' Certain procedural matters,
however, are clear.
Under current state and federal decisional law'1
and detainer statutes,"1 a convict must make an
affirmative demand for trial. To be effective, this
demand must be made not only to prosecuting
authorities but to the court having jurisdiction as
well. 5 4 The demand must be asserted promptly
(upon notification of complaint or indictment) and
objection should be voiced at every delay caused
by the prosecution so as to preclude any charge
of waiver by acquiesence.
Upon receipt of a prisoner's demand for trial, the
prosecutor then has the "constitutional duty to
146 Dickey v. Florida, -U.S.-, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1578
(1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
17 Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183,203 (D.Md.
1955), a.ff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
'
48 E.g., Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684,
687 (D.C.Cir. 1966); Williams v. United States, 250
F.2d 19,21 (D.C.Cir.1957); IX J. WIGaoR, EViDENCE
§2487 at 280-81 (3rd ed. 1940); Note, The Right to
Speedy Trial, 20 STAN L. Rv. 476, 502-03 (1968).
4A presumption of prejudice in cases of extended
delay would also alleviate the defendant of the practi-
cal difficulties inherent in proving various intangible
harms, i.e., failure of memory, public accusation, and
personal anxiety. See Dickey v. Florida, -.U.S.-, 90
S.Ct. 1564, 1577 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
5oSee generally, J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
48.04(2)(Cipes ed.1968).
"'Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F.Supp. 708, 715
(N.D.Ga. 1969).162 See note 101 supra.
m See notes 56, 61, and 62 supra.
' United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.
1967); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S.880 (1958); State
v. Smith, 10 N.J. 84, 89 A.2d 404 (1952); In re Ditton's
Petition, 145 Mont. 594, 403 P.2d 205 (1965); INTER-
sTATE AGRzmmNT ON DETAiNERS art. 1II(a)(1956).
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make a diligent, good-faith effort..." 15 to bring
the cause to trial. If the accused is in a federal
penitentiary, a state prosecutor may obtain cus-
tody of the accused by requesting that the execu-
tive authority of his state ask the United States
Attorney General to cause the release or transfer
of the defendant' 5 If the prosecutor finds the
accused to be imprisoned in another state, two
means of procurement are available to him. Where
the holding state is party to the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, the charging jurisdiction may
invoke section five of the actY' Alternatively, the
prosecutor might employ article IV(a)'S of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, providing the
respective jurisdictions have adopted it.' Like the
Extradition Act, the rendition of a convict into the
temporary custody of the prosecuting jurisdiction
under article IV(a) is dependent on the discretion
of the holding jurisdiction's governor 60
115 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. at 383.
15618 U.S.C. §4085 (1964) reads in part:
(a) Whenever any federal prisoner has been in-
dicted, informed against, or convicted of a felony
in a court of record of any State or the District of
Columbia, the Attorney General shall, if he finds
it in the public interest to do so, upon the request
of the Governor or the executive authority thereof,
and upon the presentation of a certified copy of
such indictment, information or judgment of con-
viction, cause such person, prior to his release, to
be transferred to a penal or correctional institution
within such State or District.
15 See note 66 supra.
Its Article IV(a) reads as follows:
The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in
which an untried indictment, information or com-
plaint is pending shall be entitled to have a pris-
oner against whom he has lodged a detainer and
who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party
state made available in accordance with Article
V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written re-
quest for temporary custody or availability to the
appropriate authorities of the state in which the
prisoner is incarcerated: provided that the court
having jurisdiction of such indictment, information
or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded
and transmitted the request: and provided further
that there shall be a period of thirty days after re-
ceipt by the appropriate authorities before the re-
quest be honored, within which period the governor
of the sending state may disapprove the request
for temporary custody or availability, either
upon his own motion or upon motion of the pris-
oner.169 See note 61 supra.
160Article IX of the INrTsTmrx AGREEMENT ON
DETAINERs, however, calls for a liberal construction of
its provisions so as to effectuate it purpose, i.e., the
interstate rendition of convicts on whom detainers
have been served. See May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203,
205 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969), indicates that the refusal of a
holding state to render a convict for trial in anotherjurisdiction is subject to review by the federal courts
"since it would tend to interfere with... Sixth Amend-
ment rights."
When the prosecution chooses not to go to trial,
the convict has two options. If he desires a speedy
trial he can cause a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum'83 to be issued from the trial court'8 '
having jurisdiction over his case to secure his re-
lease for trial. Otherwise, he may refrain from
taking any affirmative action towards securing an
early trial and hope the charges against him will be
dropped before the termination of his sentence. In
doing this, the convict would of course run the risk
of facing trial at the end of his sentence where any
claim to the denial of his right to a speedy trial
might be held waived by his silence.
Should a convict's demand for a speedy trial by
means of motion, writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quendum, mandamus, 63 or other appropriate means
prove ineffectual, a recent Fourth Circuit decision,
Kane v. Virginia,8 4 makes federal habeas corpus
relief166 available to the convict. Kane, a prisoner
serving a five year sentence at a federal peniten-
tiary in Illinois, received a detainer in 1966 from
Virginia charging him with grand larceny. After a
series of requests for speedy trial were ignored by
prosecuting authorities and the Virginia trial court,
Kane in 1968 petitioned the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia for dismissal of the charge
against him and removal of the detainer. Kane's
petition was summarily dismissed. Upon denial of
relief by the state, the Illinois convict sought
habeas corpus relief in the United States District
Court of Eastern Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1964). This application was denied. 6
Although relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) is
granted normally only after trial by the state and
full exhaustion of state remedies, 6 7 the Fourth
Circuit Court granted immediate relief. Sensing
the unfairness in requiring the detainee to raise and
adjudicate the speedy trial issue in the state court
at the end of his federal sentence for purposes of
161 cf. United States v. Kipp. 232 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1956); Thompson v. Stephens County, 450 P.2d 853
(Okla. Crim. 1969); Heredon v. State, 369 P.2d 650
(Okla. Crim. 1962). See also Carbo v. United States,
364 U.S. 611 (1961) (Power of federal district court to
issue writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum extends
nationwide).
162 Lawrence v. Willingham, 373 F.2d 731, 732 (10th
Cir. 1967).
163 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 375 (1969); Dickey
v. Circuit Court, 200 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1967). But see
Thompson v. Stephans County, 450 P. 2d 853 (Okla.
Crim. 1969).
164 419 F.2d 1369 (4th Cir. 1970).
'85 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1964).
186 419 F.2d at 1370.
167 Id. at 1372. See also Word v. North Carolina, 406
F. 2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969); Sanders v. United States,
297 F. Supp. 375 (N. D. Ga. 1969).
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exhaustion, Judge Butzner stated, 'Denial of
speedy trial adversely affects both the prisoner's
present circumstances and his ability to defend
himself in the future. Only a present remedy can
lift its dual oppressions." 16 Accordingly, the
Court ordered Kane discharged from custody
under the detainer and that the Virginia charges
be barred. 69
In order for a convict to obtain federal habeas
relief against untried charges underlying a detainer,
three preliminary requirements must be met.
First, the prisoner must make demands for trial.17°
Second, the convict must show that the state failed
to make a diligent effort to bring him to trial.
Finally the prisoner must exhaust all state reme-
dies in seeking the dismissal of the state charges' 7'
Additionally, it is crucial that such pre-trial habeas
corpus relief be brought in a federal district court
having jurisdiction over the state wherein the charge
is pending."2
Generally, if the state, following the Hooey man-
date, brings the convict to trial upon his demand,
the determination of any deprivation to the right
to a speedy trial will be made by the state court.178
Speaking for the majority of the Court in Hooey,
Mr. Justice Stewart remanded petitioner's case to
the Texas trial court.74 Judging from the concur-
rences of Justices Black,17 5 Harlan, 7 and White,'
it appears that the determination as to whether
petitioner Smith's nine year delay in trial
amounted to constitutional violation was to be
made by the trial court. Dismissal was not manda-
tory. Nevertheless, it would seem most consistent
with the thrust of the Hooey doctrine that in
11 419 F.2d at 1372.
16 9 Id. at 1373.
"'0 May v. Georgia, 409 F. 2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
'7' Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369, 1373 (4th Cir.
1970); Piper v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 1259, 1261(D.C.Conn.1969).
1"2 See Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th
Cir. 1969); Piper v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 1259(D. C. Conn. 1969); Sanders v. United States, 297 F.
Supp. 375 (N. D. Ga. 1969); Lawrence v. Blackwell,
298 F. Supp. 708 (N. D. Ga. 1969). Contra, Ashley v.
Washington, 394 F. 2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968).
"'Accord, May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203, 205 (5th
Cir. 1969); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F.Supp 708,
715-16 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Maryland v. Kurek, 233
F. Supp. 431, 433 (D. Md. 1964).
74 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
175Judgment is set aside only for the purpose of
giving the petitioner a trial, and that if a trial is given
the case should not be dismissed." Id. at 383.
176 'q do not believe that Texas should automatically
forfeit the right to try petitioner." Id. at 384.
'77 "I join the opinion of the Court, understanding
its remand.., to leave open the ultimate question
whether Texas must dismiss the criminal proceedings
against the petitioner." Id. at 384.
future cases involving inordinate and oppressive
delays by the prosecution that a trial court would
be compelled to dismiss the stale charges against
the defendant.'7 Of course, upon an adverse
determination by the state courts, a defendant
would always have recourse to the federal courts
for habeas corpus relief.7
CONCLUSION
The mandate of Smith v. Hooey has given the
convict's right to speedy trial new vitality. It
serves the immediate needs of the accused convict
who prior to the Supreme Court decision suffered
immeasurably from denial of his sixth amendment
right. Yet the beneficial effects of the decision
inure to society as well. ' 0 As indicated in requiring
the prosecution to come forward with an early
trial on each detainer filed against a convict, the
undesirable effects resulting from nuisance de-
tainers on both rehabilitation and correctional
administration are alleviated."'
Nevertheless, the reform in the areas of criminal
administration and the jurisprudence surrounding
the right to speedy trial is not complete. The fact
that only twenty states have adopted the Inter-
state Agreement on Detainers makes this glaringly
obvious. Indeed, the full statewide adoption of the
Agreement would greatly aid the administrative
effectuation of the Hooey mandate. Though Hooey
is a step in the proper direction in giving greater
judicial strength to the right to a speedy trial, legal
anachronisms still pervade the law in this area.
The strict adherance to the demand doctrine in
cases involving convicts is a vivid example of such
archaic law.
In the last analysis, the effectuation of the Hooey
decision as well as the speedy trial guarantee is
greatly dependent on the good-faith cooperation
of good faith cooperation of judicial and correc-
tional administrators on all levels of our federal-
istic system." 2 Without such cooperation, Glad-
stone's maxim-"justice delayed is justice denied"
-will continue to ring its simple truth.
7 See generally United States v. Smith, 418 F. 2d
1120, 1123-6 (D. C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J. dissenting);
8A J. MooRE, FEDERA PRAcTicz 48.03. (Cipes ed.
1968).
"'See Word v. North Carolina, 406 F. 2d 352 (4th
Cir. 1969); Pitts v. North Carolina 395 F. 2d 182(4th Cir. 1968); Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp. 488
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
180 See Dickey v. Florida, -U.S...., 90 S.Ct. 1564,
1571 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
' See notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
182 Note, supra note 11, 1209.
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DUE PROCESS, SELF-INCRIMINATION, AND STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
IN THE WAKE OF LEARY AND TURNER
I. INTRODUCTION
The word "presumption" is used to mean many
different things, but this they all have in common:
they involve a relationship between a proven or
admitted fact or group of facts, A, and another
fact or conclusion of fact, B, which is sought to
be proven.'
Presumptions in law have been created by
legislatures in order to facilitate the successful
prosecution of crimes where particular required
items of proof are unusually difficult to demon-
strate. Two presumptions were recently questioned
by the Supreme Court in Leary v. United States2
and Turner v. United States.' The former case dealt
with trafficking in marihuana, while the latter
dealt with heroin and cocaine.
Prior to the Leary decision the government was
able to prosecute marihuana cases under the
Marihuana Tax Act' and the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act5 with virtual assurance
that it would gain a conviction if it could establish
that the defendant was in possession of marihuana
when arrested. 6 The government would win be-
cause the defendant would either not have paid
the transfer tax under the Marihuana Tax Act or
not be able to overcome the statutory presumption
in §2(h) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export
Act Leary altered this, however.
1 F. j~ims, Cvr PnocEDunn 248 (1965).
395 U.S. 6 (1969). Leary has been noted in e.g.,
6 HousToN L. Rlv. 185 (1968); 20 CAsE W. REs. L.
Rlv. 251 (1968); and 83 HA v. L. REv. 103 (1969).
8396 U.S. 398 (1970).
4 INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, §4744(a) (2).
1 21 U.S.C. §176a (1964).
6 See e.g., United States v. Minor, 398 F.2d 511
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 932, aff'd, 396
U.S. 87 (1969); Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d
260 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Vil, 282 F.Supp.
472 (D. Mass. 1968); and Arrizon v. United States,
224 F.Supp. 26 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
7The presumption in 21 U.S.C. §176a, §2(h) of the
Act, is that if the accused is found to be in possession
of marihuana, it is deemed that he has knowledge of
its having been illegally imported.
The courts have been somewhat inconsistent in
imalyzing the effects of the presumption, however.
For example, in United States v. Gibson, supra, the
court said that the statute merely shifted the burden
going forward onto the accused and that the govern-
ment still had to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. 310 F.2d at 82. In United States v. Mont,
306 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1962), moreover, Judge Friendly
On December 22, 1965, Dr. Timothy Leary
crossed the International Bridge at Laredo, Texas,
on his way to Mexico. The Doctor and his party
were denied entry by the Mexican authorities. The
Doctor then returned to the American side. An
inspection of Leary's car by American officials
disclosed small amounts of marihuana.
Leary was subsequently indicted for smuggling
marihuana into the United States,3 transporting
and concealing marihuana illegally brought into
the United States,9 and transporting and con-
cealing marihuana without paying the transfer tax
imposed by the Marihuana Tax Act.10 He was
wrote that the government, in a case involving a
similar statutory presumption regarding narcotics,
had the burden of establishing that the defendant
knew that he was receiving, concealing, etc. a narcotic
drug imported in violation of the law. Thus, he con-
strued the statute (21 U.S.C. §174 (1964) in this case)
to require a showing of scienter. In the Gibson case the
scienter requirement seems to have been tacitly
abandoned so long as possession is shown. The court
intimated, however, that had the defendant shown
that a sufficient quantity of marihuana was domesti-
cally produced the presumption might be rebutted."
8 The indictment charged a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§176a which reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
whoever, knowingly, with intent to defraud the
United States, imports, or brings into the United
States marihuana contrary to law, or smuggles or
clandestinely introduces into the United States
marihuana which should have been invoiced, or
receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner
facilitates the transportation, concealment, or
sale of such marihuana after being imported or
brought in the United States contrary to law, or
whoever conspires to do any of the foregoing acts,
shall be imprisoned not less than five years or more
than twenty years and, in addition, may be fined
not more than $20,000 ....
Whenever on trial for a violation of this sub-
section, the defendant is shown to have or to have
had the marihuana in his possession, such pos-
session shall be deemed suficient evmidence to au-
thorize conviction unless the defendant explaim his
possession to the satisfaction of the jury. (Em-
phasis added.)9Id.
10INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §4744(a)(2) reads in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who is a
transferee required to pay the transfer tax imposed"
by section 4741(a)-
(1) to acquire or otherwise obtain any mari-
huana without having paid such tax, or
(2) to transport or conceal, or in any manner
facilitate the transportation or concealment of any
marihuana so acquired or obtained.
Proof that any person shall have had in his
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found guilty on the last two countsu The smug-
gling count was dismissed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari"2 to
consider: (1) whether the requirement that Leary
pay the transfer tax violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and (2)
whether Leary was denied due process because of
the statutory presumption in 21 U.S.C. §176a,
providing that possession of marihuana is sufficient
evidence both of its illegal importation and of the
defendant's knowledge of its illegal importation.
The Court found in favor of the petitioner on both
issues."
The Court said that by requiring the petitioner
to obtain an order form from the government for
the transfer of marihuana, the Marihuana Tax
Act 4 compelled him to identify himself not only
as a transferee but also as a nonregistered transferee
within the meaning of the act.'5 The Act directed
that the information required by the registration
provisions be conveyed by the Internal Revenue
Service to state and local law enforcement agencies
on request.'6 Since the petitioner was not a person,
who, under state law, might legally possess
marihuana,17 the Court found that he was there-
possession and shall have failed, after reasonable
notice and demand by the Secretary or his dele-
gate, to produce the order form required by section
4742 to be retained by him shall be presumptive
evidence of guilt under this subsection and of
liability for the tax imposed by section 4741(a).
1 See 18 U.S.C. §4208 (1964). Petitioner was ten-
tatively sentenced to the maximum penalties under
both §176a (twenty years and $20,000) and §4744(a)(2) (ten years and $20,000), the prison sentences to
run consecutively. The minimum penalty for con-
viction under §176a is five years imprisonment with no
consideration given for a suspended sentence, for
probation, and parole is not permitted. 26 U.S.C.
§7237(d) (1964). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
decision. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967), reh. denied, 392 F.2d 220 (1968).
392 U.S. 903 (1968).
IzLeary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
14 INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954 §4741, d seq. (1964).15 395 U.S. at 16.
16INT. RxEv. CODE of 1954 §4773 (1964). In all
states possession of marihuana except by registered or
eifically authorized persons is a crime. 26 U.S.C.
§§4742(b)(1)-(2) (1964) exempts persons who receive
marihuana under medical prescription or directly
from a doctor. 26 U.S.C. §4742(b)(4) (1964) exempts
transfers to public officials. The Act suggests, moreover,
that a delivery of marihuana to an employee or agent
of a registrant is considered a "transfer" to the reg-
istrant himself. 26 U.S.C. §4755(b)(3) (1964), 26
C.F.R. §§152.41, 152.42. Delivery to a common
carrier is also a "transfer" to the, addressee. 26 U.S.C.
§4755(b)(2) (1964), 26 C.F.R. §152.127(c).17See 9b U.L.A. 409-10 (1966). Although Pennsyl-
vania and California have not adopted the Uniform
Narcotic Drugs Act, they have their own statutes
fore one of a class constituting "a select group
inherently suspect of criminal activities." I Thus,
petitioner had ample reasons to fear that trans-
mittal to state officials that he was an unregistered
transferee of marihuana "would surely prove a
significant 'link in a chain' of evidence tending to
establish his guilt" 19 under the state marihuana
laws then in effect."
The government argued that there was no in-
criminatory aspect in the Act since it was designed
to prevent a nonregistered person from obtaining
an order form." The Court rejected this argument
finding that the congressional intent was to allow
nonregistered as well as registered persons to ob-
tain the forms and prepay the transfer tax--even
though the former paid a significantly higher tax.
Hence, the Court found, Congress was serious
about the transfer being taxed and was not merely
making possession of marihuana a criminal offense.
See CAoRNm-- HnALTr & SA-ETY CODE §11530
(West 1964); PA. STAT. AN., tit. 35, §§780-2(g)
780-4(g) (1964).
18 395 U.S. at 18.
"gMarchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48
(1968).
20 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 16 n. 14. The
Court intimates that compliance with the Act could
have created a substantial risk of incrimination
under 21 U.S.C. §176a (1964), the other federal statute
under which petitioner was convicted. The Court
chose to decide this latter count on the grounds of an
unfounded statutory presumption, but it seemed
ready to find that the statute also violated petitioner's
privilege against self-incrimination since complying
with this part of the statute may involve one becoming
a forced witness against himself. See discussion note
70 infra and accompanying text.
22395 U.S. at 19. The government had an anom-
alous position to argue. It had to argue that Congress
did not really intend to issue the order form for which
the $100 tax was levied. It was merely a "put-on"
to bring trafficking in marihuana within the implied
police powers of the taxing power of the Constitution.
It was no joke, however, in Covington v. United
States, 395 U.S. 57 (1969), the companion case to
Leary. There the defendant was served by narcotics
agents with notice that they had reason to belive that
he had marihuana and that he must within eight days
produce his registration form or be liable for the tax.
Under the section, they proceeded to levy on him an
assessment of $2,903.75 including 28 cents interest.
They also impounded Covington's car. They knew, of
course, that Covington did not possess the order form
since none are ever issued. (4 Cwx. L. RP. 4125
(1969).) The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the indictment on the ground that
the defendant's fifth amendment privilege would be a
complete defense to the prosecution "unless the plea
is untimely, the defendant confronted no substantial
risk of self-incrimination, or the privilege had been
waived." 395 U.S. at 59. The Court held that the
defendant's assertion of his privilege at trial created a
legal presumption of nonwaiver. Id. at 60.
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interested in prohibiting such transfers.0 2 Refer-
ring to the disclosure requirements of the Act, 2
the Court said that the conclusion was inescapable
that the statute was intended to uncover violations
of state marfiuana laws. Thus, if a nonregistered
person complied with the Act, it would be tanta-
mount to an admission of guilt under the criminal
statutes of any state the transferee happened to
be in.
This construction of the statute dearly brings
it within the rationale of Marchetti v. United
States,U Grosso v. United Staes,25 and Haynes v.
United States.' In these cases the Court held that
it was a violation of the petitioner's fifth amend-
ment rights to require him to register and pay
the occupational tax on wagers as required by the
federal wagering tax statutes2 (Marchetti); or to
pay an excise tax on the proceeds of wagering 2
(Grosso); or to register a weapon under the National
Firearms Act" (Haynes), because to do so would
be to place the registrant in a group inherently
suspect of criminal activities under state law. The
Court in these cases reasoned that although the
petitioners did not have a right to violate state
law, nevertheless once having done so they could
22395 U.S. at 21. Clinton Hester, Assistant General
Counsel to the Treasury Department, testified before
the House Ways and Means Committee that the
bill's purpose was 'not only to raise revenue, but also
to discourage the current and widespread undesir-
able use of marihuana by smokers and drug addicts."
Hearing on H.R. 6385 before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1937).
In United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919),
and Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928), the
dissenting opinions expressed doubts about such a
statute as 26 U.S.C. §4744(a) being constitutional.
See ako Hearings an H.R. 6906 before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Finance, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 5 (1937). But see United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950), where the government in its
brief plainly took the position that the Act imposed
only a tax and not a prohibition on transfers to non-
registrants. Brief for the United States in No. 81, O.T.
1950, United States v. Sanchez 340 U.S. 42 (1950),
at 28-29.
26 U.S.C. §4733 (1964) reads in pertinent part:
... The Secretary or his delegate is authorized to
furnish upon written request, certified copies of
any of the said statements [the registration certif-
icates, etc.] or returns filed in the office of any
official in charge of an internal revenue district to
any of such officials of any State or Territory or
organized municipality therein, or the District of
Columbia .... as shall be entitled to inspect the
said statements or returns....
24 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
25 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
26390 U.S. 85 (1968).
26 U.S.C. §§4411-12 (1964).
- 26 U.S.C. §4401 (1954).26 U.S.C. §5851 (1964).
not be compelled to give evidence against them-
selves. The Court in Leary, therefore, declined the
government's request that it restrict the use to
which the federal agencies might put the informa-
tion gathered under the Act and concluded that
"a timely and proper assertion of the privilege
should have provided a complete defense to prose-
cution under §4744(a) (2)." ID
Thus, if Leary had complied with .the Act, he
would have been criminally liable under state
marihuana laws and would have furnished the
government with evidence of his own guilt. If he
failed to comply, moreover, he would have been
criminally liable under federal law. The Court
held that such a situation violated his fifth amend-
ment rights against self-incrimination since it
meant that he would first have to incriminate
himself by filing a tax return in order to claim the
protection of the fifth amendment.n
The result in Leary on this issue was predictable
given the result in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes.P
The more difficult problem is whether Congress
may, by a statutory presumption, legitimately
establish what evidence must be accepted by a
jury as conclusive of proof in a criminal case.
II. DuE PRocEss AspEcTs OF
STATUTORY PRESUMMONS
The Court, turning to petitioner's contention
that the statutory presumption contained in 21
20 395 U.S. at 27.
"'The Court made it clear that it was not dealing
with the undoubted fifth amendment right of an
accused to remain silent at trial, but rather with the
implied right that one cannot be criminally liable
for having failed to obey a statute which required an
incriminatory act to fall under the act. This was in
response to the government's claim that Marchetti did
not provide a shield for any taxpayer who was outside
thd privilege's protections. The government argued
that Leary had waived his fifth amendment right by
testifying to his not paying the transfer tax. But the
Court held that this was precisely the sort of forced
testimony that the fifth amendment should prevent.
But see Stewart, J., concurring opinion, 395 U.S. at 54.
32Warren, C. J., dissented in Marchetti and Grosso
arguing that the Court had stripped from Congress the
power to make its taxing scheme effective. He argued
that the focus of the Court's attention should have
been on the statutory requirement in 26 U.S.C. §6107(1964), which provides that federal officials must
turn over the information obtained through the
registration forms to state prosecutors. See 390 U.S.
62, 81 (1968). The Leary Court, however, refused to
follow this line of reasoning and Warren himself felt
bound by the rationale of Marchetti to concur in the
Leary result. 395 U.S. at 54.
See also 6 DUQUEsNn L. Rv. 291 (1968); 5 SAN
DIEGO L. R!v. 390 (1968); 19 SYRAcusE L. R.v.
789 (1968); 13 V=ii. L. Rlv. 650 (1968) for comments
on the Marchetti case.
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U.S.C. §176a,3 denied him due process of law,
stated:
... [A] criminal statutory presumption must be
regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary" and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend.4
That is, the Court approved the test of Tot v.
United States35 that there must be a rational con-
nection between the facts proved and the facts
presumed before a statutory presumption can be
upheld as constitutionally permissible. 36
In Tot the accused had been convicted under
the Federal Firearms Actn for receiving a firearm
in interstate commerce after having been previ-
ously convicted of a violent crime. The only
evidence the government offered was that Tot was
in possession of a firearm when arrested and that
he had been previously convicted of assault and
battery.3 The statute provided that anyone who
has been previously convicted of a violent crime
and is found in possession of a firearm shall be
presumed to be in violation of the Act making it
illegal for such a person to receive a firearm in
interstate commerce. The Tot Court found that
there was no rational connection between the
possession of a firearm and its possible receipt in
interstate commerce and therefore invalidated the
presumption.
In a later case, United States v. Gainey,39 the
Court was confronted with a similar presumption.
This case involved a conviction for carrying on
the business of a distiller without having complied
with the law.40 The statute at issue presumed that
n This section imposes criminal punishment on
every person who knowingly brings marihuana into
the United States contrary to law. If the defendant is
shown to have had marihuana in his possession, the
possession is deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction under the statute unless the defendant
explains his possession to-the satisfaction of the jury.
Note 8 supra.
n 395 U.S. at 36.U 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
31Id. at 467. See United States v. Gainey, 380
U.S. 63, 67 (1965) which followed Tot and added that
significant weight should be accorded Congress's
capacity to amass the facts and cull conclusions from
them. See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S.
136, 141 (1965), which held that to infer from one's
presence at a still to his possession, custody or control
of the still is arbitrary absent some showing of the
defendant's function.
sl 52 Stat. 1250 (1938).
8319 U.S. at 464.
39 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
40 INr. REv. CODE of 1954 §5601(b) (2).
proof of the accused's presence at an illegal still
while distilling was going on was sufficient evidence
to authorize conviction, unless this presence was
explained to the jury's satisfaction. Although this
presumption appears to shift the burden of ulti-
mate nonpersuasion onto the accused, the trial
judge charged the jury that it need not convict on
the evidence of presence alone even if the accused
does not explain his presence satisfactorily. The
Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that the Tot
"rational connection" test was not satisfied by the
statute.41 The Supreme Court in turn reversed this
decision noting that the presumption was rational
since the legislative recognition of the implications
of the seclusion of an illegal still "only confirms
what the folklore teaches-that strangers to the
illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of
secrecy. We therefore hold that §5601(b) (2)
satisfies the test of Tot v. United States. . . ." 4
Thus, by using folklore as empirical data, the
Court decided that there was a rational connection
between one's presence at a still and his participa-
tion in carrying on the business of illegal distilling.
Later in United States v. Romano,41 the Court
was confronted with a companion presumption to
the one upheld in Gainey. The statute at issue in
Romano made possession, custody or control of an
unregistered still a crime.44 Presence was again
considered sufficient evidence to convict, but the
Court struck this statute down because, unlike
"carrying on," "possession" is only one function
in which one present at a still might be engaged.
The Court felt that it was therefore irrational to
conclude that presence necessarily implies pos-
session. The Court also thought that the language
in the statute would mislead the jury into thinking
that presence alone was sufficient to convict.' 5
But was this not also true in Gainey? Presence
was enough to convict for the crime of carrying
on the business of an illegal still. The Court's at-
tempt to distinguish the two cases on the basis of
the meanings of the words "possession" and
"carrying on" appears to be tenuous, too. The
"Sub noa. Barnett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292
(5th Cir. 1963).
2380 U.S. at 67-68.
'382 U.S. 136 (1965).
4,26 U.S.C. §§5601(a) (1), (b) (1) (1964).
5 This conclusion seems inescapable since the trialjudge can charge the jury that presence without ex-
planation authorizes conviction. The average juror,
moreover, would probably interpret "authorize con-
viction" as something stronger than the possibility




Court in Gainey, however, insisted that before
Gainey the trial courts had always instructed the
juries that presence was only a factor to be con-
sidered in deciding a case. 8 Congress, the Court
reasoned, intended to establish this as the rule by
creating the presumption embodied in the statute.
If this were the actual intent of Congress, how-
ever, why was the similar presumption struck
down in Romano? Surely it was possible to remove
the possible objection that presence alone was
enough to convict by means of a jury instruction
which would tend to neutralize the constitutional
infirmities contained in the statute.
The Romano Court would not allow this, how-
ever, and concluded:
Presence is relevant and admissible evidence in a
trial on a possession charge; but absent some showing
of the defendant's function at the still, its connection
with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable
inference of gult---"the inference of one from the
proof of the other is arbitrary... . ,,7
The Court would not allow the burden of persua-
sion to shift in Romano. It would allow presence
to be admitted into evidence, but the prosecution
still had to prove that the accused had a function
which connected him with possession, control or
custody on the still. This does, then, represent a
gloss on the Tot rationale compared with the
Gainey decision--despite the Court's attempt to
reconcile the two cases. In Romano, the "folklore"
on which the Court in Gainey relied was pretty
much ignored.
The Court in Leary declared that it was fol-
lowing the "upshot" of Tot, Gainey and Romano
in its decision.48 This "upshot" was said to be that
the presumed fact must be "more likely than not"
to flow from the proved fact on which it depends.
It is questionable, however, whether Tot or its
progeny had ever stated that a criminal statutory
presumption had to be at least "more likely than
not." 4 9 It is true that the language of Tot de-
manding a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact presumed did not rule out a
"more likely than not" test, but it did not demand
it either. This test, nevertheless, while not quite
reaching the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stand-
ard, the traditional test of criminal guilt, does
stiffen the minimum requirements which the
46 380 U.S. at 66.
' 382 U.S. at 14.
48395 U.S. at 36.
49 See 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 103 (1969) for a note which
discussess the standard enunciated in Leary.
Court will demand in testing the constitutional
validity of a criminal statutory presumption.
The Court in Leary found the presumption that
one possessing marihuana was presumed to possess
illegally imported marihuana which he knew to be
illegally imported violated the petitioner's due
process rights. This was so because the presump-
tion authorized the jury to infer two essential
elements of the crime: (1) the marihuana was im-
ported or brought into the country illegally, and
(2) the defendant knew it. That is, if the defend-
ant could not explain his possession of marihuana
to the satisfaction of the jury, the jury had to find
the defendant guilty. The defendant, therefore,
for all practical purposes had the burden of ulti-
mate persuasion shifted to him by means of the
statute. The Court held that the second part of
the presumption was unconstitutional because it
was not more likely than not that one in possession
of marihuana would know that it was illegally
imported.50
In reaching its conclusion in Leary, the Court
compared the amounts of foreign grown mari-
huana imported into this country with the amount
grown locally." Since the Court found that most
of the marihuana consumed was imported," the
80 395 U.S. at 52. After consideration of the means
by which a marihuana user might know if the drug is
imported or not, the Court concluded that it was
impossible to determine that the average user would
have such knowledge. So holding the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of conviction outright on
count three, failure to pay the transfer tax; reversed
the judgment of conviction on count two, illegally
importing marihuana; and remanded the case to the
court of appeals for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion. The Court added that this decision
did not imply "any constitutional disability in Congress
to deal with the marihuana traffic by other means."
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the opinion but felt
that the fifth amendment had been extended beyond
its original moorings of a testimonial privilege. Mr.
Justice Black also concurred in the result.
The Court specifically did not reach the validity
of the illegal importation inference and also refused to
reach a possible third element-that the importation
was with intent to defraud the United States.
51395 U.S. at 39. The Court relied on Hearings in, and
Control of, Narcotics, Barbiturates and Amphetamines
before a Subcommittee on Improvements in the Federal
Criminal Code of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
52 In Leary, counsel for the defendant had argued
that since federal agents themselves destroy over 1900
acres of domestic marihuana annually (enough to make
17,000,000 cigarettes) the presumption was an in-
defensible absurdity. 4 CRm L. Rpm. 4123 (1969).
In Nebraska alone there is an estimated 115,000
acres of marihuana ready for harvesting. Pop Drugs:




government contended that under Yee Hem v.
United States"s the presumption should be upheld
since in that case the Supreme Courthad sustained a
similar presumption in 21 U.S.C. §174" relating
to narcotic drugs, nearly all of which are imported.
The Court, however, refused to compare the two.
It said that even though most of the marihuana
consumed was imported, it was still unlikely that
the user (unless he is perhaps a pusher55) would
know that it was illegally imported.
The problem with a criminal statutory presump-
tion is, of course, that the courts and the legis-
latures frequently fail to specify the impact of a
rebuttable presumption on the admissibility of
- 268 U.S. 178 (1925). In this case the Court sus-
tained a presumption virtually identical to the one
at issue. The case, however, dealt with smoking opium
rather than marihuana and is, therefore, at least
distinguishable on its facts. Accord Gee Woe v. United
States, 250 F. 428 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
562 (1918); Toy v. United States, 266 F. 326 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 639 (1920).
54 21 U.S.C. §174 (1964) reads:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or
brings any narcotic drug into the United States
... contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys,
sells, or in ay manner facilitates the transporta-
tion, concealment, or sale of any narcotic drug
after being imported or brought in, knowing the
same to have been imported or brought into the
United States contrary to law, or conspires to com-
mit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the
United States, shall be imprisoned not less than
five or more than twenty years and, in addition,
may be fined not more than $20,000....
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the
defendant is shown to have or to have had pos-
session of the narcotic drug, such possession shall
be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction
unless the defendant explains the possession to the
satisfaction of the jury. (Emphasis added.)
16See United States v. Minor, 398 F.2d 511 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 932 (1969), where
the defendant argued that his conviction under the
Harrison Narcotics Act, 26 U.S.C. §4705(a), which
provided that a person who sells narcotics must do so
pursuant to a written order form which the buyer
will supply, was a violation of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court con-
victed him. In United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 976 (1969), too, the
court convicted the defendant under 26 U.S.C. §4742
(1964) for selling marihuana without paying the
transfer tax. Defendant's fifth amendment argument
was to no avail. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decisions in both Minor and Buie, Minor v. United
States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969). White, J., distinguished the
cases from Leary in that sellers and not buyers were
the subject of the prosecution. The Court reasonsed
that Minor's and Buie's purchasers would not be
willing to comply with the order form requirement to
list their sellers even if the seller insisted on selling
only pursuant to the order form, thereby creating no
substantial risk of self-incrimination. The dilemma
confronting the buyer, then, does not confront the
seller.
evidence, the burden of going forward, and the
burden of persuasion. 5" A presumption may also
overreach its avowed purpose as a rule of evidence
and become a rule of substantive law.'7 The pre-
sumption may be so strong as to become an irre-
buttable presumption rather than a means of
placing the burden of going forward on the defend-
ant or of testing the admissibility of evidence.
Despite this problem, it has been declared consti-
tutional for Congress to create an irrebuttable
presumption.58 In Bowers v. United States the
presumption in the Federal Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act provided that if any producer failed to
account for the disposition of any peanuts, it would
be deemed that he marketed an amount of peanuts
in excess of the allotment equal to the normal yield
per acre. He would therefore be liable in fines to
that extent. Thus, the government was still held to
proving that the producer did not have to prove
anything concerning the excess of normal yield
per acre. Although this looks very much like an
irrebuttable presumption, the Court held that
Congress had created a rule of substantive law and
not such a presumption.19 The reason for calling it
a substantive rule of law and not an irrebuttable
presumption is that the prosecution, even where a
statutory presumption exists, must still prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. If the presump-
tion can be called a substantive rule of law, the
problem of irrationally shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant does not arise. The burden
is still on the prosecution to establish its case, but
its quantum of proof is greatly reduced because of
the substantive rule of law with which the defend-
ant must comply.
This begs the question, however, for it is clear
that the presumption in Bowers is irrebuttable
and calling it a substantive rule of law does not
make it any less so. It merely makes it semantically
easier for the Court to defer to the Legislature's
findings.
"s Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory
Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 1141 (1966).
This article is a good probe into the constitutionality
of statutory presumptions.
7Criminal presumptions are treated in McCon-
acIK, EVmENCE 635-72 (1954); Keeton, Statutory
Presumptions-Their Constitutionality and Legal Effect,
10 TExAs L. REv. 34 (1931); Laughlin, In Support
of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MIcH. L.
REv. 195 (1953); Note, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1943);
Note, 55 CoLmz. L. Rxv. 527 (1955).
IBowers v. United States, 226 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.
1955).
"See United States v. Carlisle, 234 F.2d 196 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 841 (1956); see also United
States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
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In holding the statutory presumption in Leary
invalid, the Court did not have to wrestle with
such a problem since here the presumption was
clearly rebuttable. It did, however, have to over-
rule a series of lower court decisions which had
consistently upheld the constitutionality of the
presumption in 21 U.S.C. §176a. In Robinson v.
United States the Eighth Circuit rejected the
defendant's contention that since marihuana grew
in Minnesota, and since this fact was well known,
it was illogical to infer that the marihuana was
imported in every case. The Court held that on its
face the statute met the rational connection stand-
ard demanded in Tot. The court in Costello v.
United States" said much the same thing. It went
so far as to state that the mere fact that marihuana
was grown domestically did not render the statute
invalid even though the marihuana involved in
that case was of the domestic variety.
62
The question which arises is whether the courts
in these cases were able to ignore or rationalize
their decisions with Tot. Most of the Courts tended
to point out that the possession of a firearm or
ammunition, the subject of the Tot case, is ordinar-
ily lawful; whereas, the possession of marihuana is
lawful in only a very few particular instances-
such as for testing under government control."
This ignores the real question, however. It is not
whether we are dealing with a gun or with mari-
huana which is important. It is really a question
of whether one's possession of the gun implies that
he received it in interstate commerce or whether
one's possession of marihuana implies that he knew
that it was illegally imported. The broader ques-
tion, too, is whether Congress can create an evi-
dentiary presumption dispositive of a criminal
case which can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In other words, is it constitutionally permissible
for Congress to tell a jury what evidence it should
or should not accept as conclusive in a criminal
case?
The first doubts about validity of the §176a
presumption appeared in 1968 in the Southern
District of New York. In United States v. Adams 4
60 327 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1964).
61324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
930 (1964).62 See also Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 931 (1958).6 Borne v. United States, 332 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.
1964); United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1962); Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 451
(9th Cir. 1961). All of these cases upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statutory presumption in 21
U.S.C. §176a.
64 293 F.Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
the court held that while the first presumption in
the marihuana importation statute" (namely, that
the marihuana was illegally imported) was prob-
ably constitutional, it was arbitrary to presume
that everyone in possession of marihuana knew of
its illegal importation and to so presume violated
the defendant's due process rights. The court,
facing the realities, agreed that because many
people know or believe that a substantial amount
of marihuana is grown or harvested in the United
States, it is irrational to presume that one in
possession of marihuana knows that it is illegally
imported.6"
Adams followed the rationale of Tot saying that
even where the prosecution has a statutory pre-
sumption in its favor, it is still held to the burden
of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.67 The practical effect of the
§176a presumption, however, was to relieve the
prosecution of its traditional burden. This was so
because under this statute the court is required
to instruct the jury that the defendant was arrested
in possession of marihuana. That alone is enough to
convict him if he cannot explain such possession
to their satisfaction. A defendant could be con-
victed, therefore, without any proof that the
marihuana was illegally imported or that he knew
that it was imported. The court reasoned that this
would violate the defendant's fifth amendment
due process rights."' It would violate them because
the defendant could be convicted without the
prosecution's having to establish one of the ele-
ments of the crime, the knowledge of illegal impor-
tation.
III. SELE-IxcnINATION AsPEcTs oP
STATMUORY PRESUMMrsONS
This argument in Adams is essentially that of
the Leary decision. But just as there are due
process infirmities with the sort of presumption
found in the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export
Act, there are also problems on self-incrimination
grounds.P In order to avoid the presumption that
6121 U.S.C. §176a (1964).
66293 F.Supp. at 779. This goes further than Leary
since in the latter case the Court decided that most
marihuana consumed domestically is imported. See n.
52 supra and accompanying text.6'See, e.g., United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1969); United
States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962).
Is For a discussion of the due process rights involved
in this sort of case see Note, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 623
(1969).69This argument on self-incrimination grounds was
alluded to in Leary. See supra note 20.
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one knows that his marihuana has been illegally
imported, a defendant would have to take the
stand and explain his possession of marihuana to
the satisfaction of the jury. This would mean, of
course, that the defendant could not invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination, for to do so
would mean conviction since the defendant would
have to rebut the presumption if it is not to work
against him. That is, the defendant for all practical
purposes has a Hobson's choice offered to him:
either he must testify or he will be convicted. If he
must testify, he cannot invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination and rely on the possi-
bility that the prosecution will fail in establishing
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Instead, the prosecution need not produce
any evidence of the defendant's mens rea, but
rather can rely on the possibility that the defendant
will fail in rebutting the presumption to the satis-
faction of the jury. The defendant's constitutional
right is therefore threatened because the statute
makes him a forced witness if he wishes to escape
conviction. It waives his privilege for himY3
This argument was forwarded in Yee Hem v.
United States71 and rejected. There the Court
addressed itself to the contention that the federal
statute was unconstitutional which provided that
possession of smoking opium was, in the absence
of a satisfactory explanation, prima facie evidence
of the crime of concealing it with knowledge of its
unlawful importation 2 The Court said:
The statute compels nothing. It does no more
than to make possession of the prohibited article
prima fade evidence of guilt. It leaves the accused
entirely free to testify or not, as he chooses. If
the accused happens to be the only repository of
the facts necessary to negative the presumption
arising from his possession, that is a misfortune
which the statute under review does not create, but
which is inherent in the case.Y
The statute does compel, however. It compels the
defendant to bear the burden of going forward
despite his fifth amendment privilege against
testifying against himself. The Court, moreover,
70 This argument was advanced in Ruis v. United
States, 328 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1964) and rejected. The
case, however, was a habeas corpus proceeding following
a conviction on a plea of guilty. The statutory pre-
sumption was not operative, therefore, and perhaps
the court's denying the argument following a guilty
plea does not offend the rules of criminal evidence.
71268 U.S. 178 (1925).
7 21 U.S.C. §174 (1964).
"268 U.S. at 185.
seems to be saying that since it is more convenient
to have the defendant bear the burden of proof in
these cases, we will allow Congress by legislative
flat to place that burden on him. Tot, however,
held that the test of comparative convenience in
placing the burden of going forward on the accused
was impermissible absent some showing of a
rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed. Tot also said that the
inference of one fact from proof of another should
not be so unreasonable as to be a purely aribtrary
mandate7 4 and that the process of determining
such connection must be highly empirical, amassed
from the stuff of actual experience 5
Thus, after Tot, the test of comparative con-
venience can no longer be the sole standard by
which the burden is shifted to the defendant. If it
were, the legislature might validly command that
the proof of the identity of the accused should
create a presumption of the existence of all facts
essential to guilt since he is in a better position to
know these facts than is the prosecution. This
result would run counter to all valid precepts of
criminal evidence. What such a presumption would
do, of course, would be to presume the defendant
to be guilty until he proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is innocent.
Although the regulation of narcotics is somewhat
different from the regulation of marihuana, never-
theless if Tot is to be taken seriously, the rejection
of the self-incrimination argument in Yes Hen;
should be revalued where presumptions do force
an accused to take the stand or be convicted.
Since Yee Hem was decided before Tot perhaps
the Court should not reject arguments out of hand
based on self-incrimination grounds.
Recently, the Court in Turner v. United States?6
had an opportunity to revalue the Ye Hem decision
but refused to do so. In Turner the accused was
found guilty on two counts of violating the Nar-
cotic Drugs Import and Export Act7 and on two
counts of violating the federal statute which
makes it a crime to purchase, possess, dispense or
distribute narcotic drugs from other than the
74 See also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944);
Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942),
cerl. denied, 319 U.S. 770, reh. dened, 324 U.S. 889(1943).
75 See supra note 52.
76 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
-21 U.S.C. §174 which is identical to the mari-
huana statute except that it pertains to narcotic drugs.
The text of the statute appears at note 54 supra. The




original stamped packages7 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction7
despite the petitioner's argument that the trial
court's instructions on the inferences that might
be drawn from an unexplained possession of drugs
violated his privilege against self-incrimination by
penalizing him for not testifying about his pos-
session of the drugs.
The Supreme Court ignored this argument and
chose to focus its attention on the defendant's
failure to show that heroin was domestically
produced8 0 The Court, however, did find that
cocaine was produced in this country in such quan-
tity as to negate the presumption that one in
possession knew of its illegal importation. The
Court, therefore, affirmed with respect to the
heroin counts and reversed with respect to the
cocaine counts.
This decision, however, involves the Court in
some circular reasoning. The Court acknowledges
that Leary did not decide whether a criminal
presumption must satisfy the criminal "reasonable
doubt" standard of proof but that even under its
"more likely than not" standard, Turner would
stand convicted. It said that the prosecution had
the burden of showing that Turner (1) knowingly
received, concealed and transported heroin which
(2) was illegally imported and which (3) he knew
was illegally imported.m The Court said, moreover,
that the government had to prove each of these
three elements to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court upon enunciating the black
letter theory of criminal law, then proceeded to
allow the opposite result to follow. The govern-
ment's proof in the case consisted in showing that
the defendant was in possession of heroin; and
since he didn't explain his possession to the satis-
faction of the jury, the Court permitted the pre-
sumption to operate, resulting in his conviction on
grounds of his knowing that the heroin was illegally
imported.P
The Court, therefore, approved Congress's
attempt to shift the burden of proof on the defend-
- 26 U.S.C. §470(a) (1964). Counts three and four
involved heroin and cocaine violations of the statute
respectively.
79 404 F.2d 782 (1968).80 The Court thus concentrated on petitioner's due
process rights, but chose to avoid whether the statute
involved any self-incrimination problems, or, at least,
felt that this subject was moot.81396 U.S. at 405.
82 The trial judge had instructed the jury that pos-
session in the absence of any explanation by the
defendant was sufficient to convict him.
ant in a case involving the possession of heroin.
The Court construed the rationale of Gaiiw8 to
mean that an instruction to the jury can be given
which authorizes but does not require the jury to
convict on possession alone. 4 This presupposes,
of course, that the defendant will attempt to rebut
the inference of the statute. If he does not, then
possession alone is sufficient to convict, and the
trial judge is so authorized to charge the jury.
The Court also said that the jury in this case
was justified in accepting the legislative judgment
that possession of heroin is equivalent to possessing
illegally imported heroin 0s But this does not reach
the defendant's knowledge of its illegal importa-
tion. Presently, the defendant must testify if he
wishes to show the jury that state of his mind.
This does not mean that the prosecution should
have to show the defendant's subjective state of
mind. It simply means that the prosecution should
introduce enough evidence to indicate what the
accused's state of mind was such that the jury can
draw its own inference with regard to that state.
It means that the prosecution under our system of
jurisprudence should have to establish every
element of a crime.
Thus, although the Court paid lip service to the
proposition that the government bears the burden
of proving that the accused knew the heroin was
illegally imported, it in fact required the accused
to prove that he did not know that it was illegally
imported. Apparently, the Court was again relying
on the fact that it is within the accused's personal
ambit of knowledge as to whether he did or did not
believe that the heroin was illegally imported s
The test of comparative convenience, however,
can only be used where there is a rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and'the fact presumed
and, applying the gloss from Leary, where one fact
is more likely than not to occur in the presence of
the other. Is it more likely than not to infer that
one possessing heroin will know of its having been
illegally imported? But even this question does
not reach the true crux of the issue. It may very
well be within Congress's power to determine
whether most heroin is illegally imported, but it
is beyond its power to determine whether all who
83See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
84 396 U.S. 398, 406 at note 6.
85 It is this type of interference by Congress in thejury's domain which Black finds so objectionable.
See his concurring opinion in Leary, 395 U.S. at 55, and
his dissenting opinion in Turner, 396 U.S. at 425.
4 This is the position which Tot expressly overruled.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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possess it know of its illegal importation. This
element of scienter, however, is necessary in order
to gain a criminal conviction.P
The Court seemed to recognize, too, that the
ordinary jury would not always know that heroin
illegally circulating in this country was not manu-
factured here. Therefore, it felt that the presump-
tion was needed. It also seemed to recognize that
the knowledge aspect was a matter of some doubt
since Mr. Justice White, in writing the opinion,
went to great pains to point out that Turner was
a distributer and not a user and was therefore
aware that the heroin was illegally imported.
All this rhetoric, however, does not conceal the
weakness of the Court's argument that this pre-
sumption also applies to users, that the burden of
persuasion is shifted to the defendant, that the
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's
knowledge of the heroin's being illegally imported
is lifted from the government, and that the defend-
ant stands in jeopardy unless he takes the stand."
Despite these problems the Court in Turner, as
mentioned earlier,90 chose to ignore this argument
and concentrated on asking whether there was any
empirical data to show that heroin was produced
domestically. Finding none, it concluded that
under Leary it was more likely than not that the
possession of heroin meant that it was illegally
imported heroin and that the defendant knew
that it was illegally imported. This, of course,
meets the criteria for the empirical side of the
Leary test, but does not answer the question of
whether it violates one's privilege of not having to
testify against oneself. Following this argument
to its conclusion, then, it should be apparent that
if the standard of placing the burden is not stricter
than in Yee Hem," the defendant must accept the
burden whether he wishes to remain silent or not.
"The standard to prove this element of scienter,
however, need not be more than circumstantial.
396 U.S. at 416-17.
"It would seem that the average jury might dis-
believe an accused arrested in possessi6n of heroin who
testified that he did not know of its being illegally
imported. It would seem, too, that a jury could find
the requisite knowledge should the government build
a sufficient case showing facts sufficient to indicate
that he would know of its being illegally imported
should he choose to remain silent. Thus, the presump-
tion may not be necessary to win a conviction. It
makes it easier to win one; but because of the con-
stitutional problems it raises, it should perhaps be
abandoned.
"0 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
9" The Yee Hem standard seems to be based on some
sort of comparative convenience rationale.
If he wishes to be convicted, he will stand upon his
privilege; if he wishes to rebut the statute, he
must perjure himself as well as establish part of
the government's case in chief, if he is in fact
guilty.
IV. CONCLUSION
A criminal statutory presumption stands as
suspect, then, because it is possibly only a con-
venient way to secure a conviction without having
the government bear the burden of producing all
the evidence sufficient to show guilt. Whether this
result should be countenanced by the Court is
probably in direct proportion to how much weight
it ascribes to the black letter assertion that a man
is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty.92
Under a statutory presumption such as the ones
in 21 U.S.C. §174 or §176a, moreover, an accused
is arguably placed under a serious threat of self-
incrimination if the statute is construed so as to
shift the burden of proof to him without regard
for the rationality of the presumption. 3 Since Tot
rejects the approach of shifting the burden without
a showing of rationality, the lesson of Leary and
Turner is that any criminal statutory presumption
may be suspect on either due process or self-
incrimination grounds." Although Congress can
"Guilt is not only an objective state either. It also
connotes a subjective state of the criminal. No statu-
tory presumption can reach this latter state, but this
state has been traditionally inferred by juries from
circumstantial evidence put on by the government.
The question is whether this should be any different
n cases involving drugs.
"This seems to be the case in Turner since the court
can instruct the jury that possession absent explana-
tion is enough to convict.
94But see Walden v. United States, 417 F.2d 698
(SthCir. 1969), 6 CRnw. L. Rpm 2105 (SthCir. 10/2/69)
where the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C.
§176a for failing to declare the 350 pounds of mari-
huana concealed in his hearse when he crossed the
border. The court said that the requirement that all
marihuana brought into the United States must be
declared and invoiced does not compel an illegal
importer to incriminate himself. The court reasoned
that it would be strange to punish a traveler for fail-
ure to declare ordinary merchandise and at the same
time to hold that an importer of contraband does not
have to declare. Since no one compels him to import
contraband, his fifth amendment rights are not vio-
lated.
The court further said that since the government
placed no reliance on the presumption in §176a, the
Leary decision was inapposite and the conviction would
be affirmed. Since the defendant was apprehended while
crossing the border, this case is somewhat different
from the case where one apprehended in the United
States would be subject to the presumption.
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declare what acts are criminal, it must be circum-
spect in declaring what evidence is sufficient to
convict." Since this latter is the traditional task of
the jury to determine and since the prosecution
u This is what justice Black argues against in his
concurring opinion in Leary (395 U.S. at 55). His
determination to protect the inviolability of the jurytrial appears as he scores Congress for attempting to
take the finding of fact away from the jury through the
device of a statutory presumption.
"Congress has no more constitutional power
to tell a jury it can convict upon any such forced
and baseless inference than it has power to telljuries they can covict a defendant of a crime with-
out any evidence at all from which an inference of
guilt could be drawn."
See alsohis concurring opinion in Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. at 473, and his dissenting opinion in UnitedStates v. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 74. Black is saying that
Congress cannot take the fact-finding function away
from the jury and that the only time a statutry pre-
sumption could be relied upon is when there is a ra-
tional connection between the facts inferred and the
facts which have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. That is, the facts p roved must be relevant
evidence -which tends to show the existence of the
facts presumed. This way the jury is still permitted
to make the final inference even though the presump-
tion makes that inference easier to make.
must bear the risk of ultimate nonpersuasion, any
sweeping declaration by Congress that evidence
of one kind or another will be conclusive of guilt is
suspect where sensitive fifth amendment rights
are concerned, and especially where it tends to
relieve either the jury or the government from their
respective and traditional tasks.
The thrust of this comment does not reach the
question of how the government should control
illegal trafficking in drugs. It merely points out a
legitimate concern of the Court in this area. This
concern is that the areas in which a statutory
presumption can operate are perhaps narrower
than either Congress or the federal prosecutors
would like. The Court seems to restrict a pre-
sumption's operative force vis-i-vis an accused's
rights on trial Perhaps the Court has not yet
reached the point where presumptions, such as the
ones found in 21 U.S.C. §174 or §176a, will be
struck down on self-incrimination grounds, but it
has found them wanting on due process grounds
in some cases.
